



mr Ana Ivković

Narodna banka Srbije
ana.ivkovic@nbs.rs

PRILIVI STRANOG KAPITALA: PODRŠKA ILI PREPREKA RAZVOJU?

Rezime

Prilivi stranog kapitala u zemlje u razvoju aktuelna su tema još od liberalizacije kapitalnih tokova. U pojedinim periodima fokus je bio na snažnom prilivu kapitala na rastuća tržišta, dok je u pojedinim fokus bio na bolnom prilagođavanju ekonomije usled njegovog naglog odliva.

Prilivi kapitala imali su značajan efekat na privredni rast u mnogim zemljama u razvoju. Povećali su njihovu kapitalnu bazu, podstakli smanjenje troškova zaduživanja i pokrenuli razvoj finansijskog tržišta. Ipak, prilivi kapitala su često bili praćeni i volatilnošću varijabli koje centralna banka koristi kao targete monetarne politike kao što su monetarni agregati, inflacija i devizni kurs. Uvažavajući navedeno, makroekonomski efekti priliva kapitala mogu se analizirati preko njihovog uticaja na inflaciju, društveni proizvod i devizni kurs. Istovremeno, moraju se pratiti i promene bilansa tekućeg i kapitalnog računa, kretanje cena aktive i kreditna aktivnost.

U cilju sprečavanja pregrevanja nacionalne ekonomije, jako bitna je i analiza razloga ovih tokova. Osnovna pitanja na koja treba dati odgovor su: a) da li je devizni kurs precenjen/podcenjen; b) da li se može ograničiti rast agregatne tražnje; c) da li je nivo deviznih rezervi adekvatan; e) da li je finansijska stabilnost zemlje dovedena u pitanje. Odgovori na ova pitanja, determinišu i potencijalne mere.

Ključne reči: strani kapital, zemlje u razvoju, tekući bilans, devizni kurs, devizne rezerve, špekulativni prilivi, strane direktne investicije, centralna banka.

Summary

Foreign capital inflows in the developing countries are a topical subject discussed ever since the liberation of capital flows. During some periods, the focus was placed on strong capital inflow into the emerging markets, while in some other ones the focus was on painful adjustment of economy due to its sudden outflow.

Capital inflows had a significant effect on economic growth in many developing countries. They increased their capital base, instigated borrowing costs reduction and set in motion growth of financial markets. Nevertheless, capital inflows often were followed by volatility of variables used by central banks as targets of their monetary policy, such as monetary aggregates, inflation, and the foreign exchange rates. With this in mind, macroeconomic effects of capital inflows may be analysed through their impact on inflation, domestic product and foreign exchange rate. At the same time, changes in the current account balance and capital account must be monitored, but also assets price movements and credit financing activities.

In order to prevent overheating of the national economy, it is very important to make the analysis of the reasons causing those trends. Basic questions to be answered are the following: a) is the foreign exchange rate overrated/underrated; b) is it possible to limit growth of aggregate demand; c) is the level of foreign exchange reserves adequate; d) is the financial stability of the country brought in jeopardy? The answers to these questions shall determine the potential measures.

Key words: foreign capital, developing countries, current account balance, foreign exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves, speculative inflows, foreign direct investments, central bank.

Ana Ivković MSc

National Bank of Serbia
ana.ivkovic@nbs.rs

FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS: A SUPPORT OR AN OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT?

Efekti priliva stranog kapitala

Kratkoročni i dugoročni efekti priliva stranog kapitala u malim i otvorenim ekonomijama, aktuelna su tema još od liberalizacije kapitalnih tokova. Brojni stručni i radni materijali su napisani na ovu temu, a nakon svake valutne ili pak finansijske krize koje su usledile neke nove lekcije su naučene. Otvarana su nova pitanja, ali su se rađale i nove dileme. Ukoliko bi rezultate svih stručnih i istraživačkih radova na ovu temu trebali da sublimiramo u jednom generalnom zaključku, on bi svakako glasio: na nerazvijenim, ili pak nedovoljno razvijenim tržištima, prilivi stranog kapitala mogu bitno uticati na ukupna makroekonomska kretanja u ekonomiji. Ovo posebno u početnim fazama razvoja finansijskih tržišta koje karakteriše niska ili nedovoljna likvidnost, odsustvo tržišnih instrumenata, visoke kamatne stope, neadekvatna infrastruktura i visok stepen nepoverenja među tržišnim transkorporima. Na takvim tržištima strani kapital je ne samo poželjan već i neophodan, jer može podstaći privredni rast i povećati konkurentnost domaće privrede. Značajniji priliv stranog kapitala nesumnjivo će povećati kapitalnu bazu u maloj ekonomiji i pokrenuti spiralu smanjenja troškova zaduživanja. Uz to, značajniji prilivi stranog kapitala mogu biti i indikator poverenja stranih investitora u nacionalnu ekonomiju.

Sa intenziviranjem kapitalnih tokova motivisanih visokim prinosima, beleži se i sve veći rast plasmana nerezidenata u državne hartije zemalja u razvoju. Obzirom da je njihova realizacija do tog perioda uglavnom bila opredeljena slabom tražnjom od strane domaćih banaka, jasno je da je dolazak nerezidenata bitno popravio likvidnost ovog tržišta. Rast inostranih plasmana u državne hartije, pre svega dugoročne, podstakao je i željeni razvoj krive prinosa. Prisustvo stranih špekulanata na domaćem tržištu novca ubzalo je i razvoj tržišta derivata. Ovo iz razloga što su svoju poziciju po osnovu plasmana u državne hartije nominirane u lokalnoj valuti nerezidenti uglavnom hedžovali kroz derivatne fx transakcije. Zbog svega navedenog, strani investitori danas predstavljaju bitan generator razvoja tržišta novca u mnogim zemljama u tranziciji.

Pored nabrojanih pozitivnih efekata, gotovo svi autori radova na ovu temu slažu se i o oceni da prilive kapitala, ma koliko oni bili poželjni, uvek treba pažljivo pratiti. Razloga za to ima nekoliko. Iznenadni značajniji prilivi stranog kapitala, ukoliko nisu sterilisani, najčešće su praćeni: a) snažnijom aprecijacijom nacionalne valute, koja može umanjiti konkurentnost domaćih razmenljivih dobara u uslovima kada je nacionalna valuta već precenjena b) naglim rastom ili pak ekspozicijom kreditne aktivnosti, što može imati negativne posledice ukoliko najveću propulziju beleži segment potrošačkih i gotovinskih kredita korišćenih za ličnu potrošnju a ne za privredni rast. Ovo je situacija koja svakako nije poželjna u malim i otvorenim ekonomijama, jer rezultira prekomernim rastom agregatne tražnje; c) rast agregatne tražnje, koji nije praćen adekvatnim rastom proizvodnje, može da indukuje nagli rast cena aktive i domaćih proizvoda, i u konačnom efektu - bolnim prilagođavanjem nacionalne ekonomije.

Konkretni efekti priliva kapitala na realnu ekonomiju zavisice od njihovih motiva i načina na koji su upotrebljeni. Dakle, ukoliko proizvodnja raste dovoljno brzo da obezbedi održivost spoljnog duga, može se očekivati da deficit tekućeg računa na duži period bude održiv. Dijametralno suprotna situacija nastaje kada prilivi predstavljaju okidače za kreditni bum i nagli rast potrošnje kako sektora stanovništva i privrede, tako i države, a rast proizvodnje i investicija izostane. Naličje ovakvih priliva svakako je neodrživost deficita tekućeg računa. Premda zaista nema generalnog pravila prema kome je priliv iskorišćen za investicije rezultirao boljim efektima od priliva iskorišćenog za potrošnju, primer azijskih zemalja u razvoju koje su nakon azijske krize zabeležile suficite tekućeg računa i snažan privredni rast, svakako govori u prilog investiciono orijentisanih priliva. Sa druge strane, prilivi u latinoameričke i istočnoevropske zemlje u razvoju tokom 90-ih mahom su korišćeni za potrošnju. U uslovima kada je deficit tekućeg računa postao neodrživ a servisiranje spoljnog duga dovedeno u pitanje, kapital je počeo da se povlači iz ovih zemalja indukujući bolno prilagođavanje nacionalne ekonomije.

Foreign capital inflow effects

Short-term and long-term effects of foreign capital inflows in small and open economies are a topical subject ever since the liberalisation of capital flows. Many professional and research studies have been written on this topic, and after every currency or financial crisis that happened, some new lessons had been learned. New questions were raised, but new dilemmas emerged as well. If we were to sum up the results of the entire research and scholastic material written dealing with this topic in one general conclusion, it would indubitably read as follows: in the under-developed or insufficiently developed markets, foreign capital inflows may have a significant impact on the global macroeconomic trends in the given economy. This especially in the initial development phases of financial markets, characteristic for low or insufficient liquidity, absence of market instruments, with high interest rates, inadequate infrastructure, and a high degree of mistrust between the market makers. In such markets, foreign capital is not only desirable but crucial as it can boost economic growth and build up competitive advantage of the national economy. A substantial foreign capital inflow shall beyond any doubt increase capital base in a small-scale economy and set in motion the spiral of borrowing cost reduction. Moreover, foreign capital inflows can also serve as indicators of confidence that foreign investors have in the national economy.

Together with intensified capital flows motivated by high yields, what is also recorded is the constant growth of placements by non-residents in the government securities of developing countries. Mindful of the fact that their sales up to that period were mostly characteristic for low demand by domestic banks, obviously it was the arrival of non-residents on the scene that had significantly improved the liquidity of those markets. Growth of foreign placements into government securities, primarily those long-term ones, instigated also the desired growth of the yield curve. The presence of foreign speculators on the domestic money market boosted, in turn, the development of the derivatives markets. The reason for this was the desire of non-residents to hedge their position,

based on placement into government securities nominated in local currency, through derivative Forex transactions. In view of the above, foreign investors today represent a significant growth generator for the money markets in many countries in transition.

In addition to the list of positive effects, almost all the authors of papers devoted to this topic agree on the view that capital inflows, no matter how desirable they may be, should always be carefully monitored. Several reasons support this stance. Sudden substantial inflows of foreign capital, if not sterilised, most often are accompanied by: a) stronger appreciation of national currency, which may lower competitive advantage of domestic exchangeable goods in the situation when the national currency is overrated; b) rapid growth or even explosion of credit financing activities, that may cause negative effects if the highest propulsion is recorded in the segment of consumer and cash loans, used for personal consumption, and not for the economic growth. This is the situation which is certainly not desirable in small and open economies, as it results in an extremely high growth of aggregate demand; c) growth of aggregate demand, which is not followed by growth of production may induce sudden assets and domestic products price jump, and in the final instance - painful adjustments to be made by the national economy.

Concrete effects of capital inflows on the real economy will depend on their motivation and manner of deployment. Hence, if the production is to grow with sufficient speed in order to secure sustainability of foreign debt, it may be expected that the current account deficit will be sustainable on long-term basis. Completely opposite situation occurs when the inflow plays a trigger for crediting boom and sudden growth in consumption both in the retail and corporate sectors, but also in the area of government administration, while the growth of production and investments remains absent. The downside of such inflow is the inability to sustain current account deficit. Although there is really no one single general rule that would indicate that the inflow used for investments resulted in better effects than the inflow used for consumption purposes, the example of Asian developing countries that have, after the Asian

Mere usmerene na upravljanje prilivima stranog kapitala

S makroekonomskog stanovišta, oslanjanje na inostrane izvore sredstava koji su mahom usmereni u potrošnju, dovodi do velikog deficita bilansa tekućeg računa. Ukoliko centralna banka želi da ublaži ili pak u potpunosti eliminiše efekte ovih priliva na devizni kurs u uslovima kada je domaća valuta već precejnena, ona mora intervenisati na deviznom tržištu kupovinom deviza i prodajom domaće valute. Najkraće, rezultati intervencija centralne banke na deviznom tržištu mogu se sublimirati kroz sledeće: a) akumuliranje deviznih rezervi, koje može biti poželjno ukoliko se trenutni nivo rezervi ne smatra dovoljnim; b) održavanje stabilnog ili pak željenog nivoa deviznog kursa; c) rast likvidnosti u domaćoj valuti. Ovo poslednje svakako će podstaći inflatornu spiralu ukoliko se višak likvidnosti u domaćoj valuti promptno ne sterilizuje. Za te potrebe centralna banka može koristiti operacije na otvorenom tržištu u smislu prodaje državnih ili hartija centralne banke kvalifikovanim tržišnim transaktorima koji će po tom osnovu ostvariti sigurne plasmane. Zbog pretećih inflatornih pritisaka kamatne stope na ove hartije će ili ostati relativno visoke ili će se dalje povećati u odnosu na stope na razvijenim tržištima. To će pak biti nesumnjiva "pozivnica" za dodatni ulazak inostranih investitora željnih kamatno-kursne arbitraže. Ovo posebno u uslovima kada tržišni transaktori smatraju da će politika intervencija na deviznom tržištu i akumulacija deviznih rezervi u jednom momentu biti napušteni, a da će se domaća valuta pustiti da aprecira.

Ukoliko troškovi sterilizacije likvidnosti u domaćoj valuti postanu preveliki, tj. centralna banka iscrpi svoje tržišno orjentisane apsorpcione mehanizme, ona može posegnuti i za ne tako popularnim povećanjem stope obavezne rezerve na određene kategorije plasmana banaka kao što su potrošački i gotovinski krediti. Ovo može rezultirati narušavanjem finansijske intermedijacije i neželjenim razvojem "sivih" tržišta. U situacijama kada se dostigne i/ili pređe željeni nivo deviznih rezervi i centralna banka ne želi da nastavi sa intervencijama na deviznom

tržištu, ili ukoliko domaća valuta previše aprecira, tj. njena precejnena vrednost postane snažan ograničavajući faktor po konkurentnost domaćih proizvoda, centralna banka može primeniti i makroekonomske ali i određene direktne mere. U tom smislu, centralna banka može: a) jačati regulativu usmerenu na sprečavanje prevelike izloženosti finansijskog sistema riziku; b) propisati kvantitativne limite za određene kategorije plasmana banaka kao što su npr. potrošački i gotovinski krediti stanovništvu; c) uvesti ili pak pooštriti mere za ograničenje priliva pojedinih oblika stranog kapitala. Naravno, primena opisanih mera nesumnjivo bi vodila riziku gubitka svih pozitivnih efekata koje prilivi stranog kapitala mogu doneti, a koji nisu zanemarljivi na malim i nerazvijenim tržištima.

Iako nemajedinstvenog recepta za upravljanje prilivima kapitala, praksa je potvrdila da će konkretne mere zavisiti od: a) oblika priliva (zvanični vs privatni; strane direktne vs portfolio investicije; obveznice vs akcije); b) očekivane ročnosti priliva (kratkoročne vs dugoročne); c) uticaja priliva kapitala na bilanse tržišnih učesnika (da li povećavaju valutnu neusklađenost bilansa). Eventualne mere će neminovno zavisiti i od dinamike promene indikatora eksterne pozicije nacionalne ekonomije kao i održivosti spoljnog duga.

Sam izbor i kombinacija mera koje će centralna banka koristiti kako bi smanjila negativne i potpuno iskoristila pozitivne efekte značajnijih priliva stranog kapitala svakako će zavisiti od režima monetarne politike i makroekonomskih karakteristika zemlje. U tom smislu, zadatak je posebno težak za zemlje sa režimom fiksnog deviznog kursa zbog tzv. nemogućeg trojstva (impossible trinity - open economy trilemm) prema kome slobodan priliv kapitala, režim fiksnog deviznog kursa i nezavisna monetarna politika ne mogu ići zajedno te se nešto mora žrtvovati. Visoki kamatni diferencijali karakteristični za tržišta u razvoju, u kombinaciji sa fiksnim deviznim kursom, postaju pravi izazov za špekulante. Kratkoročni kapital motivisan prvenstveno brzom i lakom zaradom, vremenom će nadmašiti apsorpcione moći domaćeg tržišta. Ekonomija počinje da se pregreva, dok se prilivi moraju sterilisati u cilju odbrane nivoa

crisis, recorded current account surplus and a powerful economic growth, certainly speaks in favour of an investment oriented capital inflow. On the other hand, inflows into Latin American and Eastern European developing countries, during the 1990s, were mostly used for consumption purposes. In a situation where the current account deficit becomes unsustainable and foreign debt servicing brought under a question mark, capital starts to drain out of such countries, inducing painful adjustments to be made by the national economies.

Measures aimed at foreign capital inflows management

From the macroeconomic point of view, reliance on foreign sources of funding, mostly directed towards consumption, brings about a large current account balance deficit. If the central bank wishes to mitigate or totally eliminate the effects of these inflows on the foreign exchange rate in the situation when the domestic currency is already overrated, it must intervene on the foreign exchange market with the purchase of foreign currency and sale of domestic currency. In a word, results of central bank intervention on the foreign exchange market may be summed up as follows: a) accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which may be desirable if the current level of reserves is not deemed to be adequate; b) maintaining a stable or desirable level of foreign exchange rate; c) growth of liquidity in domestic currency. This latest shall certainly boost inflationary spiral if the liquidity surplus in domestic currency is not promptly sterilised. Central bank may deploy for these purposes open market operations in the sense of sale of government securities or central bank bonds to the qualified market transaction brokers, who will in turn make secure placements. Due to hostile inflationary pressures, interest rate on these securities shall either remain relatively high, or shall continue to grow in respect to the rates on developed markets. This shall serve as an unequivocal "invitation" for additional entry of foreign investors keen on interest-exchange rate arbitration. This is especially the case when market makers deem that the policy of intervention on the foreign exchange market

and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, at some point in time, will be abandoned, and that the domestic currency will be set free to appreciate.

If the sterilisation costs of domestic currency liquidity should become too high, i.e. if the central bank should exhaust its market oriented absorption mechanisms, it can reach for, not very popular, increase of the required reserves rate on certain categories of bank placements, such as consumer and cash loans. This may result in derogation of financial intermediation and side effects in the form of development of "grey" markets. In a situation when the desired level of foreign exchange reserves is achieved or exceeded, and the central bank should no longer be willing to continue with foreign exchange market interventions, or if the domestic currency should be excessively appreciated, i.e. its overrated value should become a powerful limiting factor for competitive advantages of domestic products, central bank may apply macroeconomic, but also certain direct measures. To that end, central bank may proceed as follows: a) strengthen regulatory framework aimed to prevent excessive risk exposure of the financial system; b) prescribe quantitative limits for certain categories of bank placements, such as for example consumer and cash loans in retail operations; c) introduce or intensify measures for limiting inflow of certain forms of foreign capital. Implementation of these measures, of course, would undoubtedly lead to the risk of loss of all the positive effects that the foreign capital inflows can bring about, and which are not insignificant in small and undeveloped markets.

Although there is no single recipe for capital inflows management, practice has confirmed that concrete measures will depend on the following: a) the form of inflow (official vs. private; foreign direct vs. portfolio investments; bonds vs. shares); b) expected inflow maturity (short-term vs. long-term); c) impact of capital inflow on balance sheets of market participants (are they increasing currency mismatch in the balance sheet). Eventual measures shall inevitably depend also on the dynamic of changes in the external position indicators for the national economy, and the sustainability of the external debt.

deviznog kursa. Izlazak iz tog začaranog kruga podrazumeva da se centralna banka mora odreći ili svoje nezavisnosti ili fiksnog deviznog kursa. Treće rešenje svakako je uvođenje rigoroznih ograničenja na prilive stranog kapitala, uz upadanje u zamku da se spreče i oni poželjni dugoročni prilivi.

Za zemlje sa režimom fleksibilnog kursa reakcija na prilive kapitala je jednostavnija obzirom da podrazumeva: a) manji obim intervencija na deviznom tržištu. Ipak, čak i u uslovima fleksibilnog deviznog kursa, praksa je pokazala da centralne banke nisu potpuno indiferentne na kretanje deviznog kursa zbog njegovog uticaja na inflaciju, bilanse tržišnih učesnika i konkurentnost domaćih proizvoda. Ali, nesporno je da su u ovom režimu obim i intervencije centralne banke na deviznom tržištu znatno niži od istih u uslovima fiksnog deviznog kursa. Ono što je pak jako bitno jeste da centralna banka treba da reaguje na prekomerne oscilacije valute u oba smera, kako se ne bi stvorio utisak da intervencije idu samo u jednom smeru, čime se stvaraju izvesniji uslovi za priliv špekulativnog kapitala; b) usvajanje veće fleksibilnosti kursa stvorice veću neizvesnost u pogledu fluktuacija kursa, a time i veći rizik. Ovo će pak nesumnjivo umanjiti prilive špekulativnog kapitala. Sa druge strane, bilansni rizici koji proističu iz značajnih fluktuacija kursa u uslovima visoke valutne neusklađenosti u bilansima tržišnih transakcija, znatno su viši u ovim zemljama i mogu indukovati velike kreditne rizike. Ne treba zaboraviti ni činjenicu da fleksibilan devizni kurs nesumnjivo predstavlja prvu liniju odbrane u uslovima značajnijih priliva kapitala, ali da će reakcija centralne banke u smislu dozvole da valuta aprecira zavisiti od toga da li je trenutni nivo valute precenjen/potcenjen.

Bez obzira na režim monetarne politike, ne retko su neophodna i fiskalna prilagođavanja koja mogu usporiti rast agregatne tražnje i time umanjiti inflatorni uticaj priliva kapitala. Tako su 80-ih i 90-ih mnoge zemlje u razvoju sa izraženim neto prilivima kapitala primenile restriktivnu fiskalnu politiku (Indonezija: 90 - 94; Malezija: 88 - 92; Tajland: 88 - 93; Čile: 90 - 95). Istovremeno i reforma finansijskog sektora može biti jedan od bitnih preduslova za efikasno upravljanje prilivima kapitala.

Ovo ne u cilju kontrole priliva, već stvaranja uslova za njegovu efikasnu alokaciju. I zaista, slab i nedovoljno efikasan finansijski sistem, bez dovoljnog kapaciteta da apsorbuje prilive kapitala, bio je perpetumobile za azijsku finansijsku krizu 1997. Progresivna detorijacija kvalitetnih investicija pogurala je cenovne mehure na tržištima akcija i nekretnina, koje su na kraju postale neodržive i mehur je "pukao". Zbog toga transparentan, organizovan i efikasan finansijski sistem predstavlja bitan preduslov za bolju intermedijaciju kapitalnih priliva, umanjujući time mogućnost pregrevanja ekonomije i nastanak rizika po finansijski sistem. Ovo svakako podrazumeva i neophodan razvoj derivatnih proizvoda u cilju adekvatne zaštite od deviznog rizika na periode od minimum 3 meseca.

Konačno, nema sumnje da prilikom dizajniranja mera usmerenih na upravljanje tokovima kapitala treba uvažavati specifične okolnosti i karakteristike nacionalne ekonomije. Ipak, prilikom njihovog implementiranja od izuzetne je važnosti da one ne postanu uzrok makroekonomskih neuravnoteženosti, a ne odbrane od priliva kapitala.

Akumuliranje deviznih rezervi

Iako su visoke devizne rezerve određena garancija sigurnosti, ne treba zanemariti problem njihovog bespotrebnog „gomilanja“. Tendencija akumuliranja deviznih rezervi ciklično je prisutna, a posebno je naglašena nakon pretrpljenih kriza. Tako su i u 2010. pojedine velike ekonomije u razvoju počele da akumuliraju devizne rezerve, a nakon pretrpljenih nestabilnosti krajem 2008. i početkom 2009. Na ova kretanja upozoravaju i stručnjaci Instituta za međunarodne finansije (Institute of International Finance - IIF) prema čijoj prognozi se u 2010. očekuje rast deviznih rezervi zemalja u razvoju u iznosu od čak 515 milijardi dolara.

Pravi primer bespotrebne akumulacije rezervi u 2010. predstavljaju pojedine latino-američke zemlje. Naime, uprkos rastućem deficitu tekućeg računa u zemljama Latinske Amerike, obnovljeni priliv kapitala u 2010. rezultirao je i aprecijacijskim pritiscima zabeleženim kod pojedinih latino-američkih

The choice itself and combination of measures that the central bank shall deploy in order to mitigate negative and fully exploit positive effects of substantial foreign capital inflows shall certainly depend on the monetary policy regime and macroeconomic characteristics of the country in question. In this sense, the task is especially difficult for those countries having the regime of fixed foreign exchange rate because of the so-called impossible trinity (open economy trireme) where free capital inflow, fixed foreign exchange rate regime and independent monetary policy can not go hand in hand, thus something must be sacrificed. High interest differential, characteristic for the developing markets, in combination with the fixed foreign exchange rate, can become a real challenge for the speculators. Short-term capital, primarily motivated by speedy and easy gains, in time shall exceed absorption powers of the domestic market. Economy shall start to overheat, while the inflows must be sterilised for purpose of defending foreign exchange rate level. The way out of this vicious circle requires the central bank to renounce either on its autonomy, or on the fixed foreign exchange rate. The third solution is certainly an introduction of rigorous limits to the inflows of foreign capital, with the pitfall or falling into the trap of preventing also those wanted long-term inflows.

For countries with the regime of floating rate, the reaction to capital inflows is simpler as it entails the following: a) smaller scope of intervention on the foreign exchange market. Nevertheless, even in the circumstances of a floating foreign exchange rate, practice has shown that central banks are not completely indifferent to movements of the foreign exchange rates because of their impact on inflation, balance sheets of market participants and competitive advantages of domestic product. Yet it is indisputable that in this regime the scope and interventions of the central bank on the foreign exchange market are substantially lower than the same ones in the regime of a fixed foreign exchange rate. What remains as extremely significant point is that the central bank should react to excessive currency oscillations both ways, in order to avoid an impression that the interventions are

going in one direction only, thus creating certain conditions for inflow of speculative capital; b) adoption of a higher rate flexibility shall create a higher uncertainty regarding rate fluctuation, and thus an increased risk. This shall, beyond any doubt, decrease inflows of speculative capital. On the other hand, balance sheet risks deriving from significant rate fluctuations in the circumstances of high currency mismatch in the balance sheets of market actors are substantially higher in those countries and can induce high credit risks. Let us recall also the fact that a flexible foreign exchange rate undoubtedly stands as the first line of defence in the circumstances of substantial capital inflows, but the reaction of the central bank in the sense of allowing currency to appreciate, shall depend on whether the current level of currency is overrated or underrated.

Regardless of the monetary policy regime, not infrequently what is necessary are the fiscal adjustments that may slow down the growth of aggregate demand and thus lower inflationary impact of capital inflows. Hence, in the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries with excessive net capital inflows applied restrictive fiscal policy (Indonesia: 90- 94; Malaysia: 88 - 92; Thailand: 88 - 93; Chile: 90 - 95). Simultaneously, the reform of financial sector may become one of the significant prerequisites for efficient capital inflows management. This may not be aimed at inflows control, but at creating conditions for their efficacious allocation. Indeed, a weak and insufficiently efficient financial system, without adequate capacity for absorption of capital inflows, was a perpetuum mobile for the Asian crisis of 1997. Progressive deterioration of high quality investments pushed upwards price bubbles on equity and real estate markets, that have ultimately become unsustainable, and the bubbles burst. Thus, a transparent, well organised and efficient financial system is an important prerequisite for a better intermediation of capital inflows, reducing the danger of reaching an overheated economy and the emergence of risks for financial system. This certainly implies a necessary development of derivative products aimed at offering an adequate protection from foreign exchange risk for periods from minimum 3 months.

Finally, when designing measures aimed

valuta. Zbog toga su centralne banke ovih zemalja često intervenisale kupovinom deviza, te se očekuje da njihove devizne rezerve nastave da rastu i da na kraju 2010. dostignu rekordni nivo dovoljan za pokriće sedmomesječnog uvoza roba i usluga. Sa opadajućim marginalnim koristima po osnovu akumulacije rezervi i rastućim troškovima sterilizacije, intervencije na deviznom tržištu će najverovatnije biti dopunjene dodatnim kontrolama na prilive kapitala ili deviznim svop transakcijama.

Dok su pojedine latino-američke zemlje vodile politiku akumulacije rezervi, druge su se opredelile za njihovo korišćenje. Tako je Argentina u junu 2010. planirala da izda nove obveznice u ukupnom obimu od 1 milijarde dolara, ali je Vlada odustala jer nije mogla da ih izda po stopama ispod jednocifrene. Umesto toga, odlučili su se za korišćenje deviznih rezervi (5 milijardi dolara do oktobra 2010). Takođe, u azijskim zemljama u razvoju paralelno sa smanjenjem suficita tekućeg računa i većom fleksibilnošću deviznih kurseva, beleži se i usporavanje rasta deviznih rezervi. Ipak, prognozirani rast deviznih rezervi azijskih zemalja u razvoju u 2010. u iznosu od oko 304 milijardi dolara od kojih se čak 190 milijardi odnosi na Kinu (prognoza IIF), smatra se nepotrebnim iz dva razloga: a) čini zemlje u razvoju ranjivim na percepciju da je kurs lokalne valute ispod ravnotežnog nivoa, čime narušava odnose razmene; b) čini zemlje u razvoju ranjivim u slučaju naglog pada vrednosti aktive u koju su devizne rezerve plasirane.

Na osnovu svega iznetog jasno je da monetarne vlasti moraju imati jasnu strategiju rasta deviznih rezervi kako bi se izbegla zamka njihovog bespotrebnog gomilanja ili pak aktiviranja nekog od navedenih negativnih efekata prekomernih deviznih rezervi.

Glavni oblici priliva stranog kapitala

Ono o čemu monetarne ali i druge vlasti moraju voditi računa nisu samo obimi priliva stranog kapitala, već i oblici i ročna struktura tih priliva. Jasno je da su za malu i otvorenu ekonomiju, ali i za razvijene ekonomije, poželjniji dugoročniji prilivi obzirom da oni ne predstavljaju potencijalnu "opasnost" po

finansijsku stabilnost zemlje kao što je to slučaj sa kratkoročnim špekulativnim kapitalom.

U stručnoj ekonomskoj literaturi figuriraju različite podele priliva, a u zavisnosti od kriterijuma relevantnih za analizu i poređenje. Za potrebe ovog rada, najprimerenija je podela priliva prema stepenu rizika koji nose. U tom kontekstu, prilivi kapitala se mogu rangirati od rizičnijih - ka manje rizičnim.

1. Oblici inostranih priliva sa najvećim rizikom za domaću ekonomiju svakako su kratkoročni špekulativni prilivi koji "napuštaju" zemlju u slučaju pojave prvih znakova nestabilnosti. Reč je o prilivima motivisanim kratkoročnim profitima po osnovu kamatnih diferencijala i/ili anticipiranih promena deviznog kursa, koji zbog svog kratkoročnog karaktera mogu izuzetno brzo napustiti jedno tržište ukoliko se za tim ukaže potreba (tzv. fire-sale). Primer opisanog kretanja u praksi nalazimo u valutnoj krizi koja je potresela pojedine zemlje u razvoju tokom 90-ih godina. Ove zemlje su dugi niz godina bile "meta" inostranog kapitala zbog unosnih prinosa koji su znatno prevazilazili iste na razvijenijim tržištima. Ipak, prvi znaci nestabilnosti bili su inicijalna kapisla za pokretanje spirale odliva ovog oblika kapitala prvo iz Tajlanda, a potom i iz drugih istočno azijskih zemalja. Time su otvorena vrata azijskoj finansijskoj krizi (1997.), a strahovanja od devalvacije zahvatila su čitav region. Centralne banke potrošile su značajan deo deviznih rezervi u borbi za odbranu valute. I pored toga, deprecijacije valuta dovele su ne samo do valutnih, već potpunih finansijskih kriza koje su privredama tih zemalja nanele veliku štetu. Slično je bilo i tokom valutne krize krajem 90-ih, kada se prvi udar valutne krize osetio u Meksiku, ali su se špekulativni napadi ubrzo proširili i na ostale latino-američke valute (tzv. Tekila efekat).

Popularan i sada već široko-prihvaćen naziv za ovaj oblik kapitala je „hot money“, tj. vruć novac. Pridev „hot“ potiče od činjenice da je reč o kapitalu koji može jako brzo da se kreće i prelazi sa jednog na drugo tržište, zbog čega se i smatra potencijalnim izvorom finansijske nestabilnosti. Kako ovaj kanal zaista funkcioniše? Veliki prilivi vrućeg kapitala koji prevazilaze apsorpcione moći domaćeg tržišta - značajno povećavaju ponudu novca. Ukoliko

at capital inflows management, indubitably it is necessary to respect specific circumstances and characteristics of national economy. Nevertheless, once measures are applied, it is extremely important to insure that they shall not turn into causes of macroeconomic imbalances, instead of being defence lines against capital inflows.

Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves

Although high foreign currency reserves stand as a certain guarantee of security, we must not neglect the problem of their unnecessary “pilling up”. Tendency to accumulate foreign currency reserves is cyclically present and especially emphatic during sustained crisis. Thus, in 2010, some of the large developing economies started to accumulate foreign exchange reserves after suffered instability crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. These are the trends warned of by the experts of the Institute for International Finance - IIF, and according to their estimates, in 2010, growth of foreign exchange reserves in the developing countries is expected to reach as high as 515 billion US dollars.

One outstanding example of unnecessary accumulation of reserves in the year 2010 is the case of some Latin American countries. Namely, in spite of a growing current account deficit in the Latin American countries, a renewed capital inflow in the year 2010 resulted also in an appreciation pressure recorded on some of the individual Latin American currencies. Therefore, central banks of these countries often intervened by purchasing foreign currencies, so it is expected that their foreign exchange reserves will continue to grow and reach by the end of 2010 the record level sufficient to cover a seven-month import of goods and services. With the decline of marginal benefits based on accumulation of reserves and growing sterilisation costs, interventions on the foreign exchange market will most probably be supplemented by additional controls of capital inflows, or by foreign exchange swap transactions.

While some of the Latin American countries conducted policies of reserves accumulation,

some other ones decided in favour of their deployment. In June 2010, Argentine planned to issue new bonds in the total volume of 1 billion US dollars, but the government renounced on that plan as it could not issue bonds at rates below one digit. It decided, instead, to deploy foreign exchange reserves (5 billion dollars up to October 2010). Moreover, in Asian developing countries, parallel to the decrease in current account surplus and higher flexibility of the foreign exchange rates, they have recorded slowing down of growth of foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, forecasted growth of foreign exchange reserves in the Asian developing countries, for the year 2010, in the amount of some 304 billion US dollars, from this amount as much as 190 billion covered by China (forecast IIF), is deemed unnecessary for two reasons: a) it is making developing countries more vulnerable to the perception that the local currency rate is below the balanced level, thus disturbing exchange ratios; b) it is making developing countries more vulnerable in case of a sudden fall in value of assets in which the foreign exchange reserves are placed.


In view of the above stated, it is clear that monetary authorities must have a clear strategy for growth of foreign exchange reserves in order to avoid the trap of their unnecessary pilling up, or of activating some of the above mentioned negative effects caused by over-sized foreign exchange reserves.

The main forms of foreign capital inflows

What monetary but also other authorities must take into account are not only volumes of foreign capital inflows, but also the forms and maturity structure of such flows. Clearly, for any small and open economy, but also for the developed economies, desirable inflows are the long-term ones as they do not present a potential “danger” for financial stability of the country, as is the case with the short-term speculative capital.

In the professional economic literature different inflows classification can be found, depending on the criteria relevant for analysis and comparison. For the needs of this paper, the most appropriate inflow classification

se isti najvećim delom preliju u potrošnju, tj. rastuću agregatnu tražnju, inflatorna spirala se neminovno pokreće. Centralna banka potom aktivira "mehanizam" sterilizacije, a podršku joj vrlo često pruža i država. Program sterilizacije najčešće podrazumeva povlačenja prekomerne likvidnosti putem operacija centralne banke. U "borbi" protiv inflacije centralna banka povećava referentnu kamatnu stopu, što deluje stimulatивно na dodatni priliv špekulativnog kratkoročnog kapitala. Ovo dalje povećava troškove centralne banke, ali još bitnije, narušava efikasno delovanje monetarne politike.



Dakle, jasno je da će centralna banka u okviru programa sterilizacije ne retko posegnuti za povećanjem referentne kamatne stope. Ipak, ove odluke uvek treba pažljivo odmeravati jer ne retko podstiču carry trade transakcije, tj. kratkoročne špekulativne prilive motivisane kamatno-kursnom arbitražom.

Šta onda centralna banka može da uradi? Može da spreči ili destimuliše dolazak kratkoročnog, favorizujući priliv dugoročnijeg kapitala. Pitanje je kako, kada novac nije obojen i ne mogu se znati prave namere investitora, te se može upasti u zamku da se ograniče prilivi i propulzivnog kapitala? Odgovor je, možda, u sledećem: a) stvaranjem povoljnog ambijenta za dugoročne plasmane; b) postizanjem i održavanjem niske i stabilne inflacije; c) smanjenjem kamatnih diferencijala u odnosu na zemlje u okruženju; i konačno, ako zatreba d) regulatornim merama. Ovi zadaci možda nisu laki, ali su, na duži rok neophodni.

Na osnovu opisanih kretanja može se izvesti zaključak da je svaki priliv špekulativnog

kapitala podjednako nepoželjan. To zapravo nije tačno. U suštini, i ovaj kapital može biti propulzivan. Pravi primer za to su investitori koji sada kupuju obveznice zemalja koje potresa fiskalna kriza, delujući time stabilizujuće na ovaj segment državnog duga. Takođe, prisustvo stranih špekulanata na tržištu novca je poželjno jer oni mogu obezbediti njegovu likvidnost u uslovima kada kapitalna baza domaćih transaktora nije dovoljna. Značajniji prilivi ovog oblika kapitala podrazumevaju i da se tržišta derivata moraju paralelno razvijati u cilju smanjenja deviznog rizika koji ovaj kapital nosi sa sobom. To znači da upravo

ovaj špekulativni kapital može podstaći razvoj novih, a posebno derivatnih instrumenata. Pravi primer za opisana kretanja je tržište Mađarske u kojoj je upravo dolazak stranih investitora bitno podstakao likvidnost tržišta državnih hartija a potom i razvoj tržišta derivata (FX swap, FRA i IRS segmenta). Zahvaljujući tome finansijsko tržište Mađarske dugi niz godina beležilo je brzi rast. Ipak, sve prednosti gotovo su nestale oktobra i novembra 2008.

godine kada su snažni rast tražnje za likvidnim sredstvima i rastuća averzija prema riziku, uticali da nerezidenti naglo prodaju mađarske državne hartije u iznosu od oko 600 milijardi forinti (preko 2 milijarde evra). Centralna banka je bila prinuđena da od oktobra do kraja novembra 2008. organizuje aukcije kupovine državnih obveznica, sa ciljem povećanja likvidnosti u domaćoj valuti ali i podsticanja sekundarnog trgovanja ovim hartijama. U istom periodu, Agencija za upravljanje dugom nije emitovala nove hartije, već je obaveze po osnovu dospelih državnih obveznica isplatila iz kredita odobrenih od međunarodnih organizacija. Značajan odliv kapitala iz Mađarske uzrokovao je i deprecijaciju forinte (tokom samo dva dana oktobra kurs je sa 265 pao na 282 forinte za evro) a pokrenuo je i seriju destabilizujućih talasa na finansijskom tržištu Mađarske. Zbog toga što fundamentalni pokazatelji mađarske ekonomije nisu govorili u prilog ovakvih kretanja, smatra se da su u tom periodu špekulativne transakcije u velikoj meri doprinele deprecijaciji mađarske


would be the one according to the level of risk that it carries. In this context, capital inflows can be ranked from the high risk towards the low risk ones.

1. The forms of foreign capital inflows with the highest risk for domestic economy certainly are the short-term speculative inflows which are “leaving” the country in case of appearance of the first signs of instability. They are the inflows motivated by short-term profits based on interest differentials and/or anticipated changes in the foreign exchange rate, which due to their short-term character, can extremely quickly leave one market if the need should so arise (the so-called fire-sale). The case of this described trend can be found in actual practice in the currency crisis that had shaken some developing countries during the 1990s. These countries were for a long number of years the “targets” of foreign capital because of profitable yields that substantially surpassed those in the developed markets. Nevertheless, the first signs of instability served as initial fuse for setting in motion the spiral of outflow of such forms of capital, firstly from Thailand, then from other Eastern Asian countries as well. Thus the doors were unlocked for the Asian financial crisis (1997) and for fears from devaluation that caught up with the entire region. Central banks invested a substantial part of their foreign exchange reserves in the fight for defence of their currency. In spite of this, currency devaluation caused not only currency crisis to explode, but also a total financial crisis to erupt, which caused the economies of those countries great damage. Similar was the case during the currency crisis in the late 1990s, when the first impact of currency crisis was felt in Mexico, with speculative attacks soon to spread on to the other Latin American currencies (the so-called Tequila Effect).

The popular and now already broadly-accepted name for this form of capital is “hot money”. The adjective “hot” derives from the fact that it is a capital that moves very quickly and can promptly pass from one market to the other, and for this reason is considered to be

a potential source of financial instability. How does this channel really function? Large inflows of hot capital, surpassing absorption capacity of the domestic market, significantly increase the money offer. If those inflows are to spill-over in their greatest part into consumption, i.e. into a growing aggregate demand, inflationary spiral inevitably is set in motion. Central bank thereupon activates its sterilisation “mechanism”, with the support very often offered by the government. Sterilisation programme usually means withdrawal of excess liquidity through operations of the central bank. In the “fight” against inflation, central bank increases reference interest rate, which serves as an incentive, attracting additional inflows of speculative short-term capital. This, in turn, further increases costs of the central bank, but more importantly, derogates efficient functioning of the monetary policy.

Diagram No 1: Inflow of interest-motivated speculative capital



Thus, it is clear that the central bank, within the scope of its sterilisation programme, not infrequently reaches for an increase in the reference interest rate. Nevertheless, such decisions should always be carefully deliberated as they often serve as attraction for the carry trade transactions, i.e. short-term speculative inflows motivated by interest-exchange arbitration.

What is the central bank to do in such cases? It can prevent or discourage the arrival of short-term capital inflows, making longer-term capital inflows more preferable. The question is how is this to be done when the money is not coloured and the true intentions of investors can not be perceived, so one can fall in the trap of limiting inflows of propulsive capital as well? The

valute. Kako se likvidnost na globalnom nivou popravljala, profitni apetiti investitora ponovo su oživeli. Usledio je pad CDS spreda za istočno-evropske zemlje, ali prilivi kapitala, iako donekle obnovljeni, nisu vraćeni na trend koji su imali pre krize.

2. Manje rizični oblici priliva kapitala svakako su krediti odobreni u domaćoj valuti jer smanjuju stepen dolarizacije/evroizacije domaćeg finansijskog sistema. Kako strani kapital neće "svojevoljno" odabrati plasmane u lokalnoj valuti u zemljama koje imaju dugu istoriju nestabilnosti domaće valute, neophodno je da lokalne vlasti usmere svoje aktivnosti na stvaranje ambijenta koji će podsticajno delovati na inostrane partnere da rađe koriste domaću nego stranu valutu. U zemljama u kojima je finansijsko tržište tek u početnim fazama razvoja ovi krediti mogu biti od izuzetne važnosti. Ovo posebno u uslovima kada banke svoje potencijale u lokalnoj valuti više usmeravaju ka prvoklasnim hartijama (hartije države i centralne banke) a manje u kreditiranje. U takvim uslovima dolazak novih kredibilnih kreditora nesporno doprinosi razvoju konkurencije na ovom segmentu tržišta, i konsekvantnom smanjenju stepena evroizacije. Paralelno sa povećanjem obima kredita, za očekivati je da usledi i snižavanje kamatnih stopa na kredite u lokalnoj valuti. U ovim naporima pomoć međunarodnih finansijskih institucija poput EBRD-a može biti vrlo dragocena, iz razloga što ova finansijska institucija ima dugogodišnju praksu kreditiranja u lokalnoj valuti. Najveći obimi ovih plasmana u zemlje u razvoju usmereni su ka lokalnoj samoupravi, finansijskim institucijama i korporativnom sektoru, na rokove od oko 5 godina (oko 45% odobrenih kredita u lokalnim valutama ima ročnost od 5 godina).

3. Sa aspekta rizičnosti portfolio investicije se smatraju jednim od sigurnijih oblika priliva kapitala. U zemljama u razvoju strane portfolio investicije su bile intenzivne tokom 90-ih godina, prevashodno u obliku plasmana u akcije. Razvoj finansijskih tržišta ubrzao je potom i plasmane u obveznice. Danas je ovaj oblik investicija izuzetno zastupljen u ukupnoj strukturi priliva. Ipak, iako je klasifikovan kao stabilniji i propulzivniji od nekih drugih oblika priliva kao što su npr. kratkoročna zaduživanja

banaka u inostranstvu, pojedina istraživanja ne potvrđuju u potpunosti ovu tvrdnju. Naime, prema podacima IIF u desetogodišnjem periodu (2001 - 2010) koeficijent varijacije neto investicija u akcije bio je niži u odnosu na neto prilive u bankarski sektor, ali su oba bila iznad jedinice i iznosila su 1,19 i 1,54 respektivno. Ovaj podatak ukazuje na činjenicu da su i investicije u akcije izuzetno volatilne i podložne snažnijim zaokretima koji su povezani sa fundamentalnim pokazateljima konkretnog tržišta. Uvažavajući navedeno, kao glavna prednost ovog oblika priliva sa aspekta makroekonomske stabilnosti navodi se činjenica da profit po osnovu ovakvih plasmana direktno zavisi od performansi same kompanije, zbog čega će strani kapital imati motiv da pruži podršku poslovanju kompanije.

4. Najmanje rizičan oblik priliva stranog kapitala svakako predstavljaju strane direktne investicije (SDI) u nefinansijski i finansijski sektor. Ovo se naročito odnosi na SDI u formi zajedničkih ulaganja, jer su njihovi efekti dugoročni a rizik po finansijski sistem zemlje najniži. To ih čini najpropulzivnijim a i ujedno i najpoželjnijim oblikom priliva stranog kapitala. I SDI u bankarski sektor su imale brojne pozitivne efekte u zemljama u razvoju. Ubrzale su rast kreditne aktivnosti, poboljšale ročnu strukturu odobrenih kredita, stabilizovale ponudu sredstava, a podstakle su i pad kamatnih stopa. Republika Češka predstavlja pravi primer propulzivnih direktnih investicija u bankarski sektor obzirom da je ova evropska zemlja u razvoju jedan od najvažnijih „domaćina“ za strane banke. Ono što češki bankarski sistem čini različitim od sistema drugih zemalja u razvoju jeste činjenica da izvori sredstava u najvećoj meri potiču od štednje u lokalnoj valuti, što izloženost njihovog bankarskog sistema inostranom kapitalu čini izuzetno niskom. Konsekvantno, nivo finansijske evroizacije češkog finansijskog sistema je najniži od svih evropskih zemalja u tranziciji. I pored ovako niskog rizika, u Republici Češkoj postoji i regulatorno ograničenje u smislu dela kapitala (20%) koji može biti transferisan na „majku banku“, te ne postoji realna opasnost od naglog odliva sredstava iz bankarskog sektora. Ipak, kako pojedine komponente SDI u bankarski sektor

answer is, perhaps, the following: a) through creation of a climate favourable for long-term placements; b) by achieving and maintaining low and stable inflation; c) by reducing interest differentials in respect to the neighbouring countries; and, finally, if necessary, d) through regulatory measures. These tasks may not be the easy ones, but they are certainly necessary in the long-term perspective.

On the basis of the trends described, a conclusion may be drawn that any inflow of speculative capital remains equally unwanted. But actually, this is not true. In fact, even such a capital may turn out to be a propulsive one. True example of this are the investors who are buying at present bonds of the countries shaken up by the fiscal crisis, thus acting in a stabilising manner on this segment of the national debt. In addition, the presence of foreign speculators on the money market is advantageous as they can secure its liquidity in the circumstances when the capital base of domestic market makers is not sufficient. Significant inflows of this form of capital imply also that the derivatives markets must be simultaneously developed for purpose of reducing foreign exchange risk that this capital embodies. Therefore, although speculative, this capital can provide an impetus to the development of new and especially derivative instruments. Good example for the described developments is the Hungarian market where the arrival of foreign investors actually impacted the liquidity of the government securities market, to be followed by the development of the derivatives market (FX, swaps, FRA, and IRS segments). Thanks to this fact, financial markets of Hungary were recording fast growth over a long number of years. Nevertheless, all the advantages have almost disappeared in October and November 2008 when the strong growth of demand for liquid funds and a growing aversion towards risk, induced non-residents to suddenly sell Hungarian government securities in the amount of some 600 billion forint (over 2 billion EUR). Central bank was forced, from October to the end of November 2008, to organise auctions for sale of government bonds in order to increase liquidity in domestic currency, but also to prompt secondary trading in these securities. In that same period, Agency for Debt Management

did not issue new securities, but paid out liabilities for matured government bonds from the credits granted by the international organisations. Significant capital outflow from Hungary caused also depreciation of the forint (during only two days of October, the exchange rate fell from 265 to 282 forint for 1 euro) and set in motion a series of destabilising ripples on the financial markets of Hungary. As the fundamental indicators of Hungarian economy did not support anticipation of such trends, the opinion prevails that, during that period, speculative transactions greatly contributed to the depreciation of Hungarian currency. As the liquidity, on the global level, was improving, so have the profit appetites of investors revitalised. What followed was the fall in the CDS spread for the Eastern European countries, but capital inflows, although renewed up to a point, have not returned to the trend they had before the crisis.

2. Less risky forms of capital inflows are certainly credits granted in local currency as they reduce the level of Dollarisation/Eurisation of domestic financial system. As the foreign capital shall not “voluntarily” select placements in the local currency in the countries having a long history of domestic currency instability, it is necessary for the local authorities to streamline their activities towards the creation of a climate favourable for foreign partners to operate rather in the local than in the foreign currency. In the countries where the financial market is yet in its initial development phase, such credits may be extremely important. This is especially the case in situations when banks are directing their potentials in local currency rather towards prime securities (government securities and securities of the central bank) than towards credit financing. Under such circumstances, the arrival of new credible creditors inevitably contributes to the development of competition on this market segment, and to the consequential reduction of the Eurisation degree. Parallel to the increase of credit financing volume, it is to be expected that the lowering of the interest rates on loans granted in local currency shall also follow. In these efforts, the assistance of the international financial institutions, such as the EBRD, may be very valuable indeed, because this financial

moгу biti izvor potencijalnog rizika za domaći bankarski sistem (pr. naglo povlačenje), treba biti oprezan prilikom potpunog uklanjanja mera za njihovo ograničenje.

Konačno, bitno je napomenuti da struktura tj. oblici priliva stranog kapitala u određenu zemlju ne retko variraju u veoma kratkim vremenskim periodima, i često su uzrokovani promenom "politike" prema prilivu stranog kapitala. Tako je u npr. Poljskoj u periodu 1997 - 1998 zabeleženo izuzetno visoko učešće SDI. Već u periodu 2004 - 2006 njihovo učešće je bilo znatno smanjeno, dok su portfolio investicije (privatizacije) ali i krediti i drugi oblici duga zabeležili snažan rast. Nakon liberalizacije tokova kapitala u Poljskoj beleži se pak značajan rast cross-border kredita, tj. direktnog zaduživanja preduzeća u inostranstvu.

Republika Češka i prilivi stranog kapitala: od recesije do ekonomskog oporavka

Adekvatan primer „nemogućeg trojstva“, ali i iznalaženja pravog puta za ekonomski oporavak i maksimalnu iskorišćenost pozitivnih efekata priliva stranog kapitala predstavlja Republika Češka. Ekonomske reforme u ovoj zemlji započete su 1991. nakon kolapsa centralno-planskog sistema. Usledili su: a) devalvacija češke krune a potom i fiksiranje njene vrednosti za korpu valuta u uskom koridoru (+/-0,5%); b) liberalizacija cena, c) liberalizacija spoljne trgovine; d) poreska reforma; e) privatizacioni talas. I pored toga, u periodu 1991 - 1993 priliv stranog kapitala je bio relativno slab kako zbog pojedinih regulatornih mera koje nisu bile podsticajne za strani kapital tako i zbog nedovoljne kredibilitnosti same ekonomije. Sa oživljavanjem rasta i smanjenjem neizvesnosti vezanih za raspad bivše Čehoslovačke, interesovanje inostranih investitora polako je počelo da raste. Kamatno-osetljivi oblici kapitala bili su podstaknuti istovremenim postojanjem: a) visokih kamatnih diferencijala; b) fiksnim kursom krune; c) relativno likvidnim deviznim tržištem. Oktobra 1995. usvojen je novi Zakon o deviznom poslovanju kojim je dodatno stimulisan priliv stranog kapitala. Visoke kamatne stope, uz stabilan kurs krune, bili su jednostavno neodoljivi za strane

investitore željne dobrih zarada, što je češku ekonomiju dovelu pravo u zamku „nemogućeg trojstva“. I zaista, 1995. i 1996. su bile godine koje karakteriše snažan priliv kapitala, ali i pregrevanje češke ekonomije. U cilju odbrane krune, centralna banka je snažno intervenisla na deviznom tržištu. Ovo je za posledicu imalo rast monetarne baze i akumulaciju deviznih rezervi. Kako bi sprečila rast inflacije u uslovima rastuće monetarne baze, centralna banka je podizala kamatnu stopu. Ovo je pak samo podsticalo priliv stranog kapitala. I time je pokrenut začarani krug. Delimično rešenje zamke usledilo je proširivanjem dozvoljenog koridora za odstupanje krune na 7,5%, čime su monetarne vlasti nastojale da bar donekle obeshrabre kratkoročne špekulativne prilive. Iako je rizik inostranih investitora po osnovu eventualne deprecijacije krune povećan, prilivi su i dalje pristizali te je u konačnom bilansu usledila njena aprecijacija. Ovo iz razloga jer je centralna banka umesto snažnih intervencija na deviznom tržištu, pustila krunu da aprecira, što joj je prošireni koridor fluktuacije dozvoljavao. Aprecijacija je pak umanjila konkurentnost izvoznih proizvoda i time podstakla usporavanje započetog ekonomskog rasta. Na krilima ovih promena usledio je i nagli rast zarada, što je dalje vodilo u kreditni bum i prekomernu potrošnju. Kao rezultat narastajuće neusklađenosti između domaće tražnje i ponude, javile su se snažne neusklađenosti eksterne pozicije Češke, tj. deficit tekućeg računa je u 1996. i 1997. dotigao čak 6,2% i 6,6% BDP-a respektivno. Alarmanтно pogoršanje fundamentalnih makroekonomskih pokazatelja na početku 1997. eskaliralo je proleća 1997. Percepcija stranih investitora značajno je promenjena, delom i kao posledica valutne krize koja je potresala južnu Aziju tokom 1997. Prilivi kapitala promenili su smer, te se beleži odliv kapitala, i to mahom onog kratkoročnog čiji je ulazak bio motivisan brzom zaradom. Proleća te godine Češka se suočila sa izuzetno turbulentnim uslovima koje je karakterisala visoka inflacija, pad realnog GDP-a, deprecijacija krune i visok deficit trgovinskog bilansa. Centralna banka svesna nemoći da u takvim uslovima brani kurs krune, napušta režim fiksnog i prelazi na režim rukovođenog fluktuiranja. Usledio je period značajnih oscilacija češke valute, a centralna banka je u kratkom periodu značajno

institution has many years of practice in granting credit facilities in local currency. The highest volumes of these placements in the developing countries are directed towards local self-governance, financial institutions, and corporate sector, with maturities of some 5 years (about 45% of credits granted in local currencies has 5 years maturity term).

3. From the aspect of risk exposure, portfolio investments are regarded as one of the safest forms of capital inflow. In the developing countries, foreign portfolio investments were intensive during the 1990s, primarily in the form of placements into equity capital. Development of financial markets has accelerated also placements in bonds. Today, this form of investment is highly present in the total inflow structure. Nevertheless, although classified as more stable and propulsive than some other forms of inflow, such as are, for example, short-term cross-border banks borrowing, certain research studies do not fully confirm this allegation. Namely, according to the IIF data, over the ten-year period (2001 - 2010), net investment in equity variant ratio was lower than net inflows into the banking sector, but both were above 1, and amounted to 1.19 and 1.54 respectively. This data indicates that investments in equity capital are also extremely volatile and subject to powerful turn-around that are linked with fundamental indicators for the given market. With respect for the above stated, what is cited as the main advantage of this form of inflow, from the aspect of macroeconomic stability, is the fact that profit based on such placements directly depends on the business performances of the company itself, and thus more reason why the foreign capital shall be motivated to offer support to the company success.

4. The least risky form of foreign capital inflows are certainly foreign direct investments (FDIs) in both the non-financial and financial sectors. This especially applies to the FDIs in the form of joint ventures as their effects are long-term ones, and the risk exposure of the financial system of the country is the lowest. This is making them the most propulsive and at the same time the most desirable form of foreign capital inflow. FDIs in the banking sector also had many positive effects in the

developing countries. They accelerated growth of credit financing activities, improved maturity structure of credits granted, stabilised the offer of funds, and boosted the fall of interest rates. Czech Republic is a good example of propulsive direct investments in the banking sector in view of the fact that this European developing country is one of the most important "hosts" for the foreign banks. What is making the Czech banking system different from the systems of other developing countries is the fact that sources of funding to the highest degree originate from savings deposits in the local currency, rendering the exposure of their banking system to the foreign capital extremely low. Concurrently, the level of financial Eurisation of the Czech financial system is the lowest of all the European countries in transition. In spite of such a low risk exposure, in the Czech Republic there is also a regulatory limitation of one part of capital (20%) that may be transferred to the "mother bank", so that there is no real danger of any sudden drain of funds from the banking sector. Nevertheless, as certain FDIs components in the banking sector may become the source of potential risk for the domestic banking system (for example, sudden withdrawal of funds), it is necessary to show prudence when totally suspending measures for their limitation.

Finally, it is important to note that the structure i.e. forms of foreign capital inflows into a certain country not infrequently vary over extremely short periods of time, and often are caused by the change in "policy" towards foreign capital inflows. Thus, for instance, in the period 1997 - 1998, an extremely high share of FDIs was recorded in Poland. Already in the period 2004 - 2006, their share was substantially lower, while portfolio investments (privatisations) but also credits and some other forms of debt have recorded a strong growth. After liberalisation of the capital flows in Poland, a significant growth in the cross-border crediting is recorded, i.e. direct cross-border borrowing by companies.

povećala kamatnu stopu. Iako je ovim potezom zaustavljena deprecijacija krune, otvoren je problem narastajućih problematičnih zajmova i finansiranja investicionih projekata. Ekonomija je potom ušla u neizbežnu recesiju tokom 1997. i 1998.

Na osnovu opisanih kretanja može se izvesti zaključak da su kreatori ekonomske politike u Češkoj nesumnjivo potcenili uticaj priliva stranog kapitala na pregrevanje ekonomije i produbljivanje eksternih neravnoteža u maloj i postepeno liberalizovanoj ekonomiji. Kako monetarne vlasti u Češkoj nisu imale podršku fiskalne politike, njihovi naponi ostali su nedovoljni. U periodu koji je usledio eksterna neravnoteža počinje da se smanjuje. Usled deprecijacije krune raste konkurentnost izvoznih proizvoda. Delimičan napredak zabeležen je 1999. i 2000. nakon čega je usledilo ponovno usporavanje privredne aktivnosti praćeno jakim aprecijacijom krune krajem 2001. i tokom 2002. Usledilo je aktivno makroekonomsko restrukturiranje praćeno ubrzanim ali održivim rastom. Sama aprecijacija bila je rezultat sve izraženijih SDI, ali i očekivanja tržišnih transaktora u pogledu budućih priliva po osnovu najavljenih privatizacija. U tom periodu volatilitnost češke krune je bila izuzetno izražena, i uvek je rezultirala i volatinošću inflacije. Ovo je pak komplikovalo sprovođenje monetarne politike u uslovima režima targetiranja inflacije (usvojen početkom 1998). U cilju apsorbovanja potencijalnih negativnih efekata velikih prodaja državne imovine na devizno tržište, centralna banka je pripremila specijalan program sterilizacije. Vlada Republike Češke usvojila je ovaj program koji je uglavnom bio zasnovan na predlogu da se privatizacioni i drugi prihodi države u stranoj valuti uglavnom drže na deviznom računu kod centralne banke. Opravdanost usvajanja ove šeme sterilizacije proizilazi i iz činjenice da su aprecijacijski pritisci u tom periodu više bili posledica očekivanja tržišnih transaktora da će priliv kapitala pokrenuti aprecijacijski talas, dok su manje bili posledica stvarnih priliva kapitala. U takvim uslovima bilo je jasno da manipulisanje kamatnom stopom ne bi bilo dovoljno sredstvo za regulisanje priliva koji nisu motivisani kamatno-kursnim diferencijalom, već očekivanjima tržišnih transaktora. Paralelno,

centralna banka je pokrenula i talas smanjenja kamatne stope sve dok se kurs izuzetno jake krune nije vratio na realan nivo usklađen sa fundamentalnim makroekonomskim pokazateljima češke ekonomije. Privatizacija u Češkoj sprovedena je izuzetno uspešno i posebno je bila intenzivna tokom 2002. kada je nivo SDI bio izuzetno visok (za 9 milijardi evra viši u odnosu na 2001.) zahvaljujući prihodima od privatizacije. Racio SDI/GDP prešao je nivo od 10% te godine uglavnom zahvaljujući prodaji Transgasa nemačkom RWE, ali i prodaji 40% akcija tri najveće komercijalne banke u Republici Češkoj.

Portfolio investicije su pak zabeležile pad 2002. tj. neto odliv koji je uglavnom bio rezultat istovremenog rasta kupovine stranih obveznica od strane čeških banka i smanjenja kupovine domaćih dužničkih hartija od strane inostranih investitora. Razlog tome svakako se nalazio u činjenici da je smanjenje kamatnog diferencijala usled talasa smanjenja kamatne stope od strane Češke centralne banke, usmerilo kamatno motivisane tokove kapitala ka Poljskoj i Mađarskoj. U periodu nakon 2003. SDI su u velikoj meri doprinele ubrzanom ekonomskom rastu Republike Češke, te padu stope nezaposlenosti i popravljaju platno-bilansne pozicije obzirom da se od 2005. beleže suficiti uprkos prisutnoj aprecijaciji krune. Na pozitivne pomake od 2004. svakako je uticao i ulazak Republike Češke u EU na početku te godine, čime je obezbeđen i bolji pristup evro-tržištima. Prilivi stranog kapitala u Republiku Češku doprineli su i razvoju tržišta derivatnih instrumenata krajem 2006. Naime, značajan pad inflacije bio je praćen padom kamatnih stopa u Republici Češkoj, te su investicije u instrumente denominirane u krunama koji nose fiksne prihode gubile na svojoj atraktivnosti. Postepena kontrakcija priliva motivisanih kamatnim diferencijalom otvorila je neke druge profitno motivisane prilive. Reč je o špekulativnim prilivima motivisanim kursnom arbitražom tokom 2006. do leta 2007. (tzv. carry trades). Iako ne postoje konkretni podaci o ovim transakcijama, nagli razvoj tržišta derivatnih instrumenata proleća 2007. podržava tvrdnju o korišćenju krune za carry trade transakcije u tom periodu.

Czech Republic and foreign capital inflows: from recession to the economic recovery

An adequate example of the “impossible trinity”, but also of finding the right way for the economic recovery and maximum benefit from positive effects of foreign capital inflows, is the Czech Republic. Economic reforms in this country started in 1991, after the collapse of the central-planning system. What followed was: a) devaluation of the Czech koruna and then fixing of its value to the currency basket in the narrow corridor (+/-0.5%); b) prices liberalisation; c) foreign trade liberalisation; d) tax reforms; e) privatisation wave. In spite of this, however, in the period 1991 - 1993, foreign capital inflow was relatively weak due to certain regulatory measures that were not sufficiently conducive to the foreign capital inflows, but also because of inadequate credibility of the economy itself. With the revival of growth and fall of uncertainties connected with the collapse of the former Czechoslovakia, interest of foreign investors started slowly to grow. Interest-sensitive forms of capital were attracted by the simultaneous presence of the following: a) high interest rate differentials; b) fixed koruna exchange rate; c) relatively liquid foreign exchange market. In October 1995, a new Law on Foreign Exchange Operations was adopted which offered additional incentives to the foreign capital inflow. High interest rates, together with the stable koruna exchange rate, were simply irresistible for the foreign investors' appetite for making easy gains, which led the Czech economy directly into the trap of “impossible trinity”. Indeed, 1995 and 1996 were the years characteristic for strong capital inflows, but also for overheating of the Czech economy. In order to defend the koruna, central bank strongly intervened on the foreign exchange market. This caused the growth of monetary base and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. In order to prevent growth of inflation in the circumstances of a growing monetary base, central bank raised the interest rate. This, in turn, only boosted the foreign capital inflow. And thus the vicious circle was set in motion. Partial solution for this trap was found in expanding the allowed floating corridor for the corona up to 7.5%, as the monetary

authorities strived to discourage, at least a little, short-term speculative inflows. Although the risk exposure of foreign investors to the eventual koruna depreciation was increased, inflows continued to arrive, and in the final balance sheet, it was its appreciation that took place. The reason for this was the fact that the central bank, instead of strong interventions on the foreign exchange market, allowed the koruna to appreciate, as the expanded fluctuation corridor so allowed. Appreciation, nevertheless, reduced the competitive advantage of export oriented products and thus instigated slowing down of the commenced economic growth. On the wings of such changes, the sudden jump in earnings was recorded, which further led to the credit boom and excessive consumption. As a result of the growing discrepancies between the domestic demand and offer, strong mismatches of external position of the Czech Republic appeared, i.e. current account deficit in 1996 and 1997 reached as high as 6.2% and 6.6% of the GDP respectively. An alarming deterioration of the fundamental macroeconomic indicators, in early 1997, escalated until the spring of 1997. Perception of foreign investors had substantially changed, in part as a consequence of currency crisis that was shaking South Asian countries during the year 1997. Capital inflows had changed direction, thus the capital drain was recorded, mostly of the short-term inflows and those motivated initially by fast gains to be made. In the spring of that year, Czech Republic was faced with an extremely turbulent situation characteristic for high inflation, fall in the real GDP, koruna depreciation, and a high deficit in the trade balance. Central Bank, well aware of its incapacity to defend the koruna exchange rate under such circumstances, abandoned the regime of the fixed and transferred to the regime of the managed floating rate. Period followed of substantial oscillations of the Czech koruna, and the central bank, over a short period of time, significantly raised the interest rate. Although this was the move that stopped koruna depreciation, a new problem was opened of the growing number of bad loans and financing of investment projects. The economy entered, then, into the inevitable recession during 1997 and 1998.


On the basis of the described developments,

Priliv stranog kapitala u Srbiju od 2000. godine

Početak makroekonomske stabilizacije u Srbiji krajem 2000. karakteriše korišćenje deviznog kursa kao nominalnog sidra za zaustavljanje i obaranje inflacije. U tom smislu, cilj je postignut obzirom da je inflacija sa nivoa od 111,9% na kraju 2000. smanjena na 14,8% na kraju 2002. U oktobru 2000. Narodna banka napušta politiku fiksnog deviznog kursa a zvanični kurs izjednačen je sa tržišnim. Uveden je režim rukovođeno fluktuirajućeg kursa dinara a izvršena je i liberalizacija cena. Usledile su i druge reforme od kojih su za ovaj rad najbitnije: a) promena modela privatizacije; b) restrukturiranje bankarskog sektora; c) donošenje zakona o tzv. staroj deviznoj štednji; d) dolazak stranih banaka. Podstaknut pozitivnim kretanjima, strani kapital je krenuo ka Srbiji. U periodu 2001 - 2009 ukupne SDI u Srbiju iznosile su 12,3 milijardi evra (na cash-flow osnovi), od kojih se 5,1 milijarda (41%) odnosi na prilive po osnovu privatizacije. Priliv stranog kapitala na tržište koje je u povoju, i čija je apsorpciona moć niska, doveo je do perioda snažnih aprecijacija i fluktuacija deviznog kursa.

snažan rast kreditne aktivnosti, koji je pretio da ugrozi inflatorni cilj, odgovorila kroz pooštavanje dozvoljenog odnosa kapitala i kredita odobrenih stanovništvu. Usledile su i dodatne mere Narodne banke koja je u toku 2006. nekoliko puta povećavala stopu obavezne rezerve banaka učinivši je posebno represivnom za kratkoročne kredite iz inostranstva. Iako su ove mere bile donekle efikasne kad je rast inozaduženja banaka u pitanju, one su pak podstakle nove kanale inostranih priliva. I zaista, od tog perioda beleži se snažniji rast direktnog stranog zaduživanja preduzeća (cross-border krediti) i talasi dokapitalizacija banaka, tako da celokupni rast kredita odobrenih privredi nije bio smanjen. Obzirom da su dokapitalizacije banka uglavnom bile iznuđene regulatornim merama a ne stvarnim potencijalom srpskog tržišta, ova sredstva su ne retko bila usmerena u 2w repo hartije Narodne banke. Zbog toga je septembra 2008. portfelj hartija Narodne banke dostigao obim od čak 2,7 milijardi evra. Imajući u vidu da je i dinar snažnije aprecirao leta te godine, te da je referentna stopa Narodne banke (15,75%) bila znatno viša od stopa u okruženju, jasno je da su plasmani u ove hartije značile visoku i sigurnu zaradu po osnovu kamatno-kursne arbitraže

Grafikon br. 1: Strane direktne investicije u Srbiju u mlrd. evra



Iz prikazanog grafikona može se uočiti da je 2006. bila godina snažnog priliva SDI u Srbiju, što je rezultiralo aprecijacijom domaće valute u 2006, snažnim zaduživanjem u inostranstvu i rastom kreditne aktivnosti. Zbog toga se 2006. može okarakterisati kao godina kreditnog buma na plitkom srpskom tržištu. Na leto 2006. Narodna banka je na

u tom periodu. Prema nezvaničnim procenama preko 10% ovog portfelja leta 2008. odnosilo se na strani špekulativni kapital (strani investitori ne mogu direktno kupovati hartije centralne banke, već za te potrebe koriste razne aranžmane sa domaćim bankama). Usled drastičnog smanjenja globalne likvidnosti i pojačane percepcije rizika prema zemljama u razvoju, o čemu svedoči i nagli skok EMBI i CDS spreada, strani kapital iz Srbije i drugih istočno-evropskih zemalja je krajem 2008. krenuo ka bankama maticama. Rezultati su bili izuzetno nepovoljni po stabilnost finansijskih sistema zemalja u razvoju, te njihove valute beleže značajnije slabljenje od oktobra 2008. Istovremeno, strani investitori se povlače i sa tržišta kapitala. Tako su indeksi na Beogradskoj

a conclusion can be made that the creators of the economic policy in the Czech Republic have, undoubtedly, underestimated the impact of foreign capital inflow on an overheated economy and deepening of external imbalances in a small and gradually liberalised economy. When monetary authorities in the Czech Republic did not have the support of fiscal policy, their efforts remained inadequate. In the period that followed, external imbalances started to diminish. Due to the koruna depreciation, competitive advantages of export products grew. Partial progress was recorded in 1999 and 2000, to be followed by a new slowing down of economic activities, accompanied by strong koruna appreciation in late 2001 and during 2002. Active macroeconomic restructuring commenced, followed by an accelerated but sustainable growth. Appreciation itself was the result of growingly forceful FDIs, but also of the market makers expectations regarding future inflows based on the announced privatisations. During that period, volatility of the Czech koruna was extremely manifested, and always resulted in inflation volatility. This had, in turn, complicated implementation of the monetary policy in the regime of targeted inflation (adopted in early 1998). In order to absorb potential negative effects of major sales of state-owned property on the foreign exchange market, central bank prepared a special sterilisation programme. Government of the Czech Republic adopted this programme which was actually based on the proposal for the privatisation and other state revenues in foreign currency to be mostly kept on the foreign exchange account with the central bank. Justification for the adoption of this sterilisation scheme results from the fact that the appreciation pressures during that period were rather a consequence of the market makers expectations that the capital inflow will set in motion an appreciation wave, while they were less a consequence of real capital inflows that had taken place. In such circumstances, it was clear that interest rate manipulation would not be a sufficient tool for regulating inflows that are not motivated by interest-exchange rates differential, but with the expectations of market makers. At the same time, central bank started a wave of interest rate decrease for as long as the exchange rate of an extremely strong koruna

shall not return back to the real level, harmonised with the fundamental macroeconomic indicators of the Czech economy. Privatisation in the Czech Republic was conducted in an extremely satisfactory fashion, and was especially active during 2002, when the level of the FDIs was extremely high (9 billion EUR higher than in 2001) thanks to the revenues from privatisation. FDI/GDP ratio exceeded the level of 10% that year mostly thanks to the sale of Transgas to the German RWE, but also to the sale of 40% shares of the three largest commercial banks in the Czech Republic.

Investment portfolios, however, recorded a fall in 2002, i.e. a net outflow which was mainly the result of simultaneous growth in purchase of foreign bonds by Czech banks, and the fall in purchase of domestic debt securities by foreign investors. Reason for this is certainly to be found in the fact that the reduction of interest differential, due to the wave of interest rate reduction by the Czech Central Bank, streamlined interest motivated capital flows towards Poland and Hungary. In the period after 2003, FDIs have greatly contributed to an accelerated economic growth of the Czech Republic, and to the fall of the unemployment rate, but also to the recovery of the balance of payment position, in view of the fact that, starting from 2005, surplus is recorded in spite of the presence of the koruna appreciation. Positive progression from 2004 was certainly impacted by the admission of the Czech Republic into the EU membership, earlier that year, thus securing better access to the euro-zone markets. Foreign capital inflows in the Czech Republic also contributed to the development of the markets trading in derivative instruments in late 2006. Namely, substantial fall of inflation was accompanied by the drop in the interest rates in the Czech Republic, and the investments into instruments denominated in koruna, bearing fixed return, were losing their attraction. Gradual contraction of the interest-differential motivated inflows, opened some other profit motivated inflows. They were speculative inflows motivated by the arbitration of exchange during 2006 and up to the summer of 2007 (the so-called carry trades). Although concrete data on such transactions is absent, sudden development of the derivative instruments markets, in the spring of 2007,

berzi pulsirali na "crvenom" talasu, a strani investitori su konstantno bili na strani prodaje. Poslovni ambijent značajno se menja. Osnovni srednjoročni izazov za stabilnost bankarskog sektora više ne predstavlja rapidna kreditna aktivnost, već ročno i valutno restrukturiranje izvora sredstava. Ipak, koordiniranim merama centralnih banaka (razni oblici bečkog sporazuma) razduživanje banaka prema inostranstvu je od marta 2009. donekle zaustavljeno, ali su obimi cross-border kredita zabeležili snažnu kontrakciju.

Upravo opisana kretanja ukazuju na visoku zavisnost zemalja u razvoju od inostranog kapitala, ali ukazuju i na nepobitnu činjenicu da njegov nagli odliv može biti izvor značajnijih nestabilnosti na plitkim domaćim tržištima. U prilog ovoj tvrdnji dodatno govore i majske (2010.) tenzije podstaknute fiskalnim krizama u perifernim zemljama evro-zone. Svi pokazatelji rizika ulaganja u zemlje u razvoju zabeležili su snažan rast, a strani investitori su se naglo povukli sa tih tržišta pokrećući talas deprecijacije njihovih valuta. I na aukcijama državnih hartija javljaju se problemi sa realizacijom, obzirom da se veliki deo tražnje za ovim hartijama odnosi upravo na inostrane investitore željne visokih zarada. Na žalost, ni Srbija nije bila pošteđena opisanih kretanja. Tako je u maju 2010. pokrenuto razduživanje banaka prema inostranstvu, produbljivanje deprecijacijskih pritiska, crveni talas na Beogradskoj berzi, dok se na do tada uspešnim aukcijama državnih zapisa realizacija značajno pogoršava. Premda se dovođenje u vezu realizacije na aukcijama državnih zapisa i odliva stranog kapitala na prvi pogled čini neosnovanim zbog činjenice da strani investitori ne mogu direktno kupovati kratkoročne zapise RS (do 12 meseci), ne treba zanemariti činjenicu da ovaj kapital, kroz različite aranžmane sa bankama, uvek pronade svoj put ka plasmanima u ove hartije.

I pored nabrojanih negativnih efekata po osnovu naglog povlačenja stranog kapitala, ne može se poreći da je on za srpsku ekonomiju doneo brojne koristi. Naime, u tranzicionom periodu on je nesumnjivo bio okosnica našeg modela rasta jer je, u odsustvu domaće štednje, pomogao srpskoj privredi da ostvari svoj potencijal za tranziciju konvergenciju. Pre eskalacije krize najveći deo naših investicija

finansiran je upravo iz inostranih izvora. Njihov udeo u BDP-u iznosio je 28%, dok je domaća štednja imala učešće od svega 8%. Paralelno sa tim, zabeležen je i značajan rast produktivnosti, a poboljšani su i spoljnotrgovinski odnosi, uglavnom kao rezultat SDI čiji je udeo od oko 7% u BDP-u bio relativno visok. Zbog svega navedenog može se konstatovati da su makroekonomska stabilnost i rast u Srbiji u periodu 2001 - 2009 u velikoj meri bili bazirani na visokom prilivu SDI (oko 12,3 milijarde evra) i kredita (oko 17,0 milijardi evra), a najveći deo privrednog rasta odnosio se na nerazmenljiva dobra.

Konstantno iznadprosečni rast sektora usluga koji je karakterističan u tranzicionom periodu, podržan je upravo visokim prilivima stranog kapitala (bankarstvo, trgovina, nekretnine). Investicije u finansijski sektor su bile izuzetno propulzivne, tako da je finansijski sistem Srbije u 2008. karakterisalo dominantno strano vlasništvo. Na kraju te godine finansijske institucije u stranom vlasništvu upravljale su s blizu 80% bilansne sume bankarskog i sektora finansijskog lizinga čime su doprinele povećanju kapitalne baze, jačanju međubankarske konkurencije i efikasnijoj alokaciji resursa. I pored talasa finansijske krize koji se na istočno-evropske zemlje prelio krajem 2008. kapitalni prilivi u Srbiju tokom 2009. bili su veći od iznosa deficita tekućeg platnog bilansa, zbog čega nije bilo potrebe da se novac od tranše MMF-a potroši u potpunosti.

Takođe, iako je obim SDI u 2009. i 2010. bio daleko niži od priliva zabeleženih u rekordnoj 2006. napravljen je izvestan napredak u njihovoj strukturi. Smanjen je obim investicija u sektor finansijskih usluga i u nekretnine, dok na značaju dobija prerađivačka industrija (investicija ruskog Gazproma u Naftnu industriju Srbije). Propulzivna je bila i investicija Fijata u Zastavu, koja je podsticajno delovala i na proizvodnju metala u US Steel-u u Smederevu. Dakle, i pored apsolutnog pada SDI u Srbiju, u poslednje dve godine se primećuje pozitivna promena u njihovoj strukturi.

supports the allegation that koruna was used for the carry trade transactions during that period.


Foreign capital inflows in Serbia starting from 2000

The start of macroeconomic stabilisation in Serbia, in the late 2000, is characteristic for the use of the foreign exchange rate as the nominal anchor against inflation, both for its containment and suppression. To that end, target was achieved as the inflation from 111.9% level in late 2000, fell to 14.8% in late 2002. In October 2000, National Bank abandoned the policy of fixed foreign exchange rate, and the official rate was equalised with the market one. Regime of the managed floating exchange rate was introduced, and price liberalisation was implemented. Other reforms were to follow, the most relevant ones for this paper being the following: a) change in the privatisation model; b) restructuring of the banking sector; c) adoption of the law on the so-called old foreign currency savings; d) arrival of foreign banks. Prompted by positive developments, foreign capital ventured towards Serbia. In the period 2001 - 2009, the total FDIs in Serbia reached 12.3 billion EUR (on the cash flow basis), from this amount 5.1 billion (41%) covered by inflows from privatisation. Foreign capital inflow into the market still in its infancy, with the low absorption capacity, brought about the period of strong appreciation and fluctuation of the foreign exchange rate.

resulted in the appreciation of the local currency in 2006, robust cross-border borrowing, and growth of credit financing activities. Thus 2006 may be qualified as the year of the crediting boom on the shallow Serbian market. In the summer of 2006, National Bank responded to the strong growth of crediting activities, which was threatening to endanger inflationary target, by tightening the allowed capital/retail lending ratio. Additional measures of the National Bank were to follow, although it had, during the year 2006, several times raised the rate of required reserves of the banks, making it extremely repressive for the short-term cross-border credits. Although these measures were efficient up to a point when speaking of the growth in cross-border banks borrowing, they did boost new channels for foreign capital inflows. Indeed, from this period onwards, a stronger growth is recorded in direct cross-border borrowing by companies (cross-border credits) and the waves of recapitalisation of banks, so that the total growth of credits granted to the corporate sector was not reduced. Mindful of the fact that the recapitalisation of banks was mainly imposed by regulatory measures, and not by the real potential of the Serbian market, these funds not infrequently were streamlined into the 2w repo securities of the National Bank. Hence, in September 2008, securities portfolio of the National Bank reached the volume of as high as 2.7 billion EUR. Bearing in mind that the dinar had also strongly appreciated during the summer of that year, and that the

reference interest rate of the National Bank (15.75%) was substantially higher than the rates in the neighbourhood countries, it is clear that the placements in those securities brought high and secure gain from interest-exchange rate arbitration during that period. According to unofficial estimates, over 10% of this portfolio, in the summer of 2008, consisted of foreign speculative capital (foreign investors can not purchase


Chart No. 1: Foreign Direct Investments in Serbia in EUR billion



The presented graph shows that 2006 was the year of strong FDI inflow into Serbia, which

directly securities of the central bank, but are using for these purposes various arrangements

Grafikon br. 2: Deficit tekućeg platnog bilansa (u % BDP-a)



Uvažavajući navedeno nesporno je da je priliv stranog kapitala u Srbiju bio prava okosnica našeg modela rasta u tranzicionom periodu. Ali, pored snažne podrške rastu, priliv stranog kapitala omogućio je i našim domaćinstvima i državi da znatno povećaju potrošnju. Pre izbijanja krize gotovo čitav dohodak Srbije je odlazio u potrošnju. S makroekonomskog stanovišta, oslanjanje na inostrane izvore sredstava koji su potom usmereni u potrošnju, dovelo je do velikog deficita tekućeg bilansa. U periodu pre krize deficit je dostigao čak 18% BDP-a, zbog čega je njegova dugoročna održivost s pravom dovedena u pitanje. Ovaj model rasta svakako je bio socijalno privlačan, ali je ekonomski neodrživ. U uslovima niske konkurentnosti naše privrede, izgledi za otplatu rastućeg spoljnog duga dovedeni su u pitanje. Iako je udeo investicija u BDP-u naizgled visok, on nije dovoljan, posebno ako se ima u vidu da struktura investicija ne podržava rast konkurentnosti.

Ipak, nema sumnje da nam je za obnavljanje ekonomskog rasta u narednom periodu potreban značajan priliv stranog kapitala. Ako taj priliv budemo iskoristili pametno, za povećanje proizvodnih kapaciteta - naročito u prerađivačkoj industriji, za očekivati je da se deficit tekućeg bilansa prilagodi na dug rok. Investicije u infrastrukturu su najbolji primer kako priliv kapitala može doprineti povećanju proizvodnih kapaciteta i poboljšanju dugoročno održivog ekonomskog rasta. I umereni deficit tekućeg bilansa na tom putu može delimično biti naličje


visokog nivoa investicija koje su nam neophodne u procesu tranzicione konvergencije. Iskustva mnogih zemalja, između ostalih i istočne Evrope, govore u prilog tome. Zbog svega navedenog može se reći da je priliv kapitala u Srbiji bio i jeste poželjan, ali treba da se okrenemo novom modelu

rasta baziranom na investicijama umesto na potrošnji, i tada ćemo moći da očekujemo nove, propulzivnije prilive stranog kapitala.

Prilivi stranog kapitala: Staro pitanje - nove preporuke eksperata IMF-a

Uklanjanje prepreka za slobodno kretanje kapitala dugi niz godina je bila jedna od važnijih preporuka u stabilizacionim programima Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda (International Monetary Fund - IMF). Ipak, inspirisana poslednjom krizom, mišljenja ekonomista ove institucije sve češće konvergiraju ka ponovnom uvođenju određenih kontrola na ranjivim finansijskim tržištima zemalja u razvoju. Svoju tvrdnju stručnjaci IMF-a potkrepljuju i činjenicom da se na tržištima zemalja u kojima je zabeležen značajan priliv stranog kapitala, već formiraju nepoželjni špekulativni „mehuri“.

Šema br. 2: Upravljanje snažnim prilivima stranog kapitala - makroekonomski i prudencijalni aspekt



with the domestic banks). Due to drastic fall in the global liquidity and enhanced perception of risk exposure towards developing countries, witnessed also by the sudden jump in the EMBI and CDS spread, foreign capital drained from Serbia and other Eastern European countries in late 2008, and turned towards parent bank headquarters. The results were extremely negative for the stability of the financial systems in the developing countries, and their currencies recorded substantial weakening from October 2008 onwards. Simultaneously, foreign investors withdrew also from the capital market. Indices at the Belgrade Stock Exchange pulsated along the "red" wave, while foreign investors constantly kept to the selling side. Business environment was now significantly changing. The main medium-term challenge for the stability of the banking sector was no longer rapid credit financing activity, but maturity and currency restructuring of the funding sources. Nevertheless, through coordinated measures of the central banks (various forms of the Vienna Agreement) settling of cross-border bank debts from March 2009 was partially suppressed, but the cross-border credit volumes recorded a robust contraction.

The described developments point out at a high dependency of the developing countries on foreign capital, but also highlight the fact that its sudden drain may become the source of significant instabilities on the shallow domestic markets. This argument is further supported by the May (2010) tensions instigated by fiscal crises in the peripheral countries of the euro-zone. All the risk indicators for investments into developing countries have recorded robust growth, and foreign investors suddenly withdrew from these markets, setting in motion a wave of depreciation of their currencies. Even at auctions of treasury securities problems now arise with actual sales, as the large part of demand for such securities is addressed actually to the foreign investors eager to make high gains. Unfortunately, neither was Serbia spared the described trends. Thus, in May 2010, debt settlement of banks for cross-border borrowing was set in motion, deepening of depreciation pressures, a red wave on the Belgrade Stock Exchange started, while at the previously successful auctions of government

securities the sales significantly deteriorated. Although making a connection between success at auction sales of government papers and the drain of foreign capital, at the first glance, seems unfounded because of the fact that foreign investors can not directly purchase short-term treasury bills of the Republic of Serbia (up to 12 months), the fact should not be overlooked that this capital, through various arrangements with banks, always finds its way towards placement in these securities.

In spite of the above listed negative effects caused by sudden withdrawal of foreign capital, it can not be denied that this capital did bring many benefits to the Serbian economy. Namely, during the transition period, it had indubitably served as the core of our growth model because it had, in the absence of domestic savings, supported Serbian economy in achieving its potential for transitional convergence. Prior to the escalation of crisis, major part of our investments was financed actually from foreign sources. Their share in the GDP reached 28%, while domestic savings had a share of only 8%. Concurrently, a significant growth was recorded in productivity, and the foreign trade relations were upgraded, mainly as the result of the FDIs having a relatively high share of some 7% in the GDP. The above stated leads to the conclusion that macroeconomic stability and growth of Serbia, in the period 2001 - 2009, were greatly based on the high inflows of the FDIs (some 12.3 billion EUR) and credits (some 17.0 billion EUR), while the major part of the economic growth pertained to the non-exchangeable commodities.

Constant above-average growth of the services sector, characteristic for the period of transition, was supported actually by the high foreign capital inflows (banking, trade, real estate). Investments into the financial sector were highly propulsive, so that the financial system of Serbia, in 2008, became characteristic for a predominantly foreign ownership. By the end of that financial year, institutions in foreign ownership reached close to 80% of the total sum of the banking sector and of the financial leasing sector, having thus contributed to the increase of the capital base, strengthening of the inter-banking competitive advantages and a more efficient allocation of resources. In spite


Aktuelni predlozi stručnjaka IMF-a kreću se ne toliko u pravcu potpune zabrane inostranih priliva, koliko u pravcu sprečavanja njihovog prebrzog rasta, sa posebnim akcentom na prilive stranog kapitala u sektor nekretnina. Istovremeno, sve češće provejava i njihova preporuka da i prilive u bankarski sektor treba ograničiti u cilju njegove zaštite od izloženosti kratkoročnom inostranom kapitalu. Da bi potvrdili možda i očigledno, apostrofira se primer iz poslednje krize kada su povlačenjem sredstava iz svojih filijala u evropskim zemljama u razvoju, strane banke indukovale čitav niz negativnih događaja na lokalnim tržištima novca. Usledila je deprecijacija nacionalnih valuta, snažna kontrakcija kreditne aktivnosti banaka, sve manja sposobnost izmirivanja obaveza po osnovu prethodno uzetih kredita, te naglo povlačenje devizne štednje. Dok je deprecijacija valute delovala podsticajno na izvoz u zemljama sa fleksibilnim kursom umanjiviši tako potencijalni pad privredne aktivnosti, u zemljama sa fiksnim režimom koje nisu imale kurs kao absorber eksternog šoka, konkurentnost domaćih proizvoda je znatno umanjena. Sa druge strane, u zemljama sa fleksibilnim kursom i visokim nivoom evroizacije, značajno su povećani bilansni rizici usled deprecijacije valuta. Ovo se posebno odnosi na Srbiju i Rumuniju u kojima je učešće kredita u stranoj valuti u ukupno odobrenim kreditima izuzetno visoko. Usledile su razne forme i oblici tzv. bečkih dogovora iniciranih od strane IMF-a i centralnih banaka (Bosna, Rumunija, Srbija, Mađarska i dr.) u cilju zadržavanja izloženosti stranih banaka prema zemljama u razvoju. Zauzvrat, bankama potpisnicama ovog sporazuma ponuđene su izvesne olakšice, pre svega u delu obavezne rezerve i otvorene devizne pozicije. Ipak, majske tenzije (2010.) usled eskalacije prvo grčke a potom i fiskalnih kriza i u nekim drugim perifernim zemljama evro-zone, dodatno su podstakli tenzije u pregrejanim finansijskim sistemima pojedinih zemalja. U Bugarskoj u kojoj aktiva bankarskog sektora prevazilazi nivo BDP-a, a grčke banke učestvuju u ukupnoj bankarskoj aktivni sa preko 26% tj. 37% ukupnog BDP-a, situacija je postala posebno neizvesna. U ovoj zemlji ceo problem sa povlačenjem banaka je posebno naglašen i zbog činjenice da najveći deo izvora za snažan

kreditni rast subsidijara grčkih banaka potiče od kredita iz inostranstva (kreditno-depozitni racio iznosi čak 200%), a ne od depozita stanovništva kao što je to slučaj u npr. Češkoj. Zbog toga bi povlačenje banaka sa grčkim kapitalom, obzirom na visoke nivoe opisanih pokazatelja, moglo da ugrozi fiksni kurs leva, uzrokuje nagli rast obaveza denominiranih u stranoj valuti i pokrene spiralu ubrzanog rasta problematičnih zajmova. Usled naraslih tenzija Bugarska centralna banka je usvojila stroža pravila u pogledu kapitalnih i racija likvidnosti. Pre svega se misli na tampone likvidnosti za slučaj iznenadnih šokova koji će za svaku banku pojedinačno biti utvrđeni na osnovu stress testa, ali i dozvoljene nivoe izloženosti prema jednom klijentu ili pak jednoj grupaciji. Takođe, u Bugarskoj i Rumuniji (aktiva bankarskog sektora takođe prevazilazi nivo BDP-a) pad profitabilnosti bankarskog sektora u 2009. bio je veći u poređenju sa drugim evropskim zemljama u razvoju, te se ne retko postavlja i pitanje opstanka pojedinih banaka. Glavni razlog naglog pada profitabilnosti nesumnjivo leži u narastajućem učešću problematičnih zajmova koji će uskoro dostići kritične nivoe (procena IMF-a za Rumuniju u 2010. je 20% ukupnih zajmova, odnosno 16% ukupne aktive bankarskog sektora Rumunije).

Ipak, ne treba zanemariti činjenicu da su subsidijari stranih banaka nezavisna pravna lica koja posluju prema zakonima zemlje domaćina, i podležu njihovoj strogoj regulativi ali i šemi zaštite depozita. U tom smislu banke u Srbiji, bez obzira na strukturu vlasništva, visoko su kapitalizovane te je mogućnost nekih nepredviđenih situacija znatno umanjena (adekvatnost kapitala banaka sa grčkim kapitalom je oko 25%). Ukoliko se apstrahuje problem grčkih banaka, nema posebnog razloga za veću paniku kada je reč o drugim oblicima neto priliva kapitala iz Grčke u druge zemlje istočne Evrope. Jedino Makedonija ima značajniji izvoz u Grčku (preko 13%), te bi pad grčkog uvoza iz Makedonije mogao negativno da utiče na eksternu poziciju Makedonije. Sa druge strane, nivo SDI koje iz Grčke idu ka drugim istočno-evropskim zemljama nije visok (Albanija: 8%, Bugarska: 7,5%, Srbija: 6%). Jedino se u Albaniji beleži značajniji udar na eksternu poziciju po osnovu dramatičnog

of the ripples of financial crisis spilling over the Eastern European countries in the late 2008, capital inflows into Serbia during 2009 were higher than the amount of the current balance of payment deficit, and thus there was no need for spending all the money from the IMF credit tranche.

In addition, although the FDI volume in 2009 and 2010 was far lower than the inflows received in the record 2006, a certain progress was made in its structure. Volume of investments into the sector of financial services and real estate was reduced with the advantage gained by the processing industry (investments by the Russian Gazprom in the Oil Industry of Serbia). Investment of Fiat into Zastava was also propulsive and it had an additional effect on the metal production industry at the US Steel mills in Smederevo. In spite of an absolute fall in the FDIs in Serbia, during the last two years, however, a certain positive change in their structure is observed.



Mindful of the above stated, it is undeniable that the foreign capital inflows into Serbia were a true backbone of our growth model during the transition period. Nevertheless, in spite of the strong support to growth, foreign capital inflow allowed also our households and the government to substantially increase consumption. Prior to the eruption of crisis, almost the entire revenue of Serbia was spent on consumption. From the macroeconomic point of view, reliance on foreign sources of funding, which are then directed solely into consumption, caused a large current account deficit. In the period before the crisis, deficit reached as high as 18% of the GDP, and its long-term sustainability was brought in question. This growth model was certainly socially attractive, but it was economically unsustainable. In the

situation of low competitive advantage of our economy, the outlooks for repayment of the growing foreign debt were brought in jeopardy. Although the share of investments in the GDP would seem to be high, it is not sufficient, especially when bearing in mind the structure of investments unsupportive of the competitive advantages growth.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that for the revival of economic growth in the forthcoming period, what is needed is a significant foreign capital inflow. If this inflow is to be used wisely for increasing production capacities - especially in the processing industries, it is to be expected that the current account balance deficit will be adjusted in the long-term perspective. Investments into infrastructure are the best example of the way how capital inflow can support building up of production capacities and improve long-term sustainable economic growth. Even a moderate current account deficit along that road can be partially a backdrop of

the high level of investments that we need dearly in the process of transitional convergence. Experience of many countries, among them Eastern European ones, speaks in favour of this argument. Mindful of the above stated, it may be said that the capital inflow into Serbia was and remains desirable, but that

we should turn towards a new growth model based on investments, instead on consumption, and thereupon have expectations for more propulsive foreign capital inflow to ensue.

Foreign capital inflows: The old question - the new recommendations by the IMF experts

Removal of barriers for a free movement of capital has remained for a long number of years one of the important recommendations in the stabilisation programmes of the International Monetary Fund - IMF. Nevertheless, inspired by the latest crisis, opinions of economists from this institution are growingly converging towards a new introduction of certain controls in the vulnerable financial markets

pada doznaka iz Grčke.

Dakle, nagli priliv stranog kapitala u mnoge zemlje u periodu pre krize nije bio besplatan. Nivoi spoljnog duga mnogih zemalja u razvoju naglo su povećani, tako da je nivo spoljnog duga (uglavnom privatnog sektora) dostigao čak 104% BDP-a u Bugarskoj i 88% u Hrvatskoj. Zbog toga se sa pravom postavlja pitanje održivosti ovakvog nivoa i strukture duga na srednji rok. Ove dve zemlje su posebno bile pogođene značajnom volatilnošću inostranih priliva u poslednjem periodu zbog režima fiksnog deviznog kursa (currency board) u Bugarskoj i kvazi fiksnog deviznog kursa u Hrvatskoj. Kreditni rizik značajno je porastao, posebno u Bugarskoj gde se beleži izuzetno nepovoljna ročna struktura duga (kratkoročne obaveze dostigle su gotovo 50% BDP-a). Sa druge strane, u zemljama sa režimom fleksibilnog ili rukovođeno fleksibilnog deviznog kursa kao npr. Rumunija i Srbija koje su se tokom krize suočavale sa snažnom deprecijacijom, veliki pritisak izvršen je na klijente banaka sa visokim deviznim obavezama i prihodima u lokalnoj valuti. Uvažavajući navedeno, ne treba da čude preporuke eksperata IMF u pogledu uvođenja određenih kontrola na ranjivim finansijskim tržištima zemalja u razvoju.

Mere za ograničenje priliva stranog kapitala: da ili ne?

Ukoliko se pogleda nekoliko decenija unazad, mogu se izolovati brojni pokušaji uvođenja mera usmerenih na ograničenje priliva stranog kapitala. Jedni su bili uspešni, drugi samo delimično, a neki su u potpunosti bili nesupešni. Drugim rečima, iskustva različitih zemalja u implementaciji kapitalnih kontrola su različita, i u velikoj meri su zavisila od motiva njihovog uvođenja, prirode mera i specifičnosti same zemlje (npr. administrativni kapacitet za implementaciju tih mera). Nesporno je pak da su mere najčešće uvođene kako bi se obezbedila monetarna kontrola i smanjili pritisci na devizni kurs i stabilnost finansijskog sistema u slučaju naglog odliva kratkoročnog kapitala.

Najčešće korišćene mere kapitalne kontrole, posebno u domenu podsticanja priliva dugoročnijeg kapitala, svakako su:

- direktni porezi na priliv kapitala;

- diferencirani porezi na priliv stranog kapitala - u cilju stimulisanja dugoročnih priliva;
- destimulativna politika obavezne rezerve za inostrana zaduženja (u smislu stope, ali i odsustva remuneracije na sredstva izdvojene obavezne rezerve po tom osnovu);
- regulatorno ograničenje plasmana stranih investitora samo na hartije dužih ročnosti;
- nemogućnost promptnog povlačenja sredstava, tj. obavezna "najava" povlačenja sredstava od strane nerezidenata (pr. sedam dana ranije);
- striktna pravila u pogledu otvorenih deviznih pozicija, ili pak uvođenje asimetričnih otvorenih deviznih pozicija;
- mere prudenijalnog karaktera (odgovarajuća racija likvidnosti i adekvatnosti kapitala).

Mere za ograničavanje priliva pojedinih oblika stranog kapitala ne moraju nužno rezultirati u smanjenju obima priliva. Ukoliko su adekvatno dizajnirane, one mogu uticati samo na promenu ročne strukture priliva i to od kratkoročnih - ka dugoročnim. Mogu uticati i na promenu učešća pojedinih oblika stranog kapitala, stimulišući priliv propulzivnijeg. Dobar primer ovih pozitivnih kretanja svakako je Čile. Nakon implementiranja adekvatnih mera kontrole u Čileu, značajno je povećano učešće SDI dok je učešće kratkoročnih plasmana smanjeno. Sa druge strane, nastojanja kolumbijskih vlasti da tokom poslednje krize (2007 - 2008) pojačaju kontrolu priliva stranog kapitala nisu bila efikasna kako u delu stimulisanja propulzivnijih priliva tako ni u usporavanju aprecijacije pezosa.

Dok pojedine zemlje uvode kapitalna ograničenja na kratkoročne prilive kapitala, druge ih samo razmatraju, dok treće preduzimaju mere kako bi dodatno privukle strani kapital. Primer prve grupe zemalja koje u poslednje vreme nastoje da ograniče kratkoročne prilive su Peru i Rusija. U grupi zemalja koje samo razmatraju eventualne mere svakako je Južna Afrika. U ovoj zemlji je nedavno vođena rasprava o svrsishodnosti uvođenja poreza na kratkoročni kapital, ali je zauzet konačan stav da je ova mera primerena za zemlje koje beleže suficit tekućeg računa što za Južnu Afriku nije slučaj. Takođe, zauzet je i stav da bi uvođenje poreza rezultiralo samo

of the developing countries. IMF experts are substantiating their arguments by the fact that in the markets of countries where a substantial foreign capital inflow is recorded, already the unwanted speculative “bubbles” are starting to form.

of foreign exchange savings. Although the depreciation of currencies acted positively on export promotion in the countries with the floating rate, mitigating the potential fall in economic activities, in the countries with the fixed regime that did not have the

Diagram No. 2: Managing strong inflows of foreign capital - macroeconomic and prudential aspect



exchange rate as external shock absorber, competitive advantage of domestic products was considerably reduced. On the other hand, in the countries with the floating rate and a high level of Eurisation, balance of payment risks substantially increased due to the currency depreciation. This especially applied to Serbia and Romania where the share of foreign currency credits in the total sum of credits granted, was extremely high. Various forms and shapes of the so-called Vienna Agreements were to follow, initiated by the IMF and central banks (Bosnia, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, etc.) for purpose of retaining the exposure of foreign banks towards developing countries.

Actual proposals tabled by the IMF experts do not lead in the direction of full ban to be imposed on the foreign inflows, but are rather inclined to suggest that their sudden growth should be prevented, with a special emphasis on the foreign capital inflows into the real estate sector. Concurrently, their recommendation is also starting to pervade that the inflows into the banking sector should be limited, for purpose of its protection against the short-term foreign capital risk exposure. In support of what is perhaps already obvious, emphasis is placed on the examples from the latest crisis, when the withdrawal of funds from their branches in European developing countries, caused the foreign banks to induce an entire series of negative events occurring on the local money markets. What followed was the depreciation of national currencies, robust contraction of credit financing activities of banks, a declining capability for debt servicing on previously borrowed funds, and sudden withdrawal

In return, banks, signatories of this Agreement, were offered certain facilities, most of all in the part of required reserves and open foreign exchange positions. Nevertheless, May tensions (2010), due to the escalation firstly of the Greek crisis, then of the fiscal crises in some other peripheral countries of the euro-zone, instigated additional tensions in the overheated financial systems of other countries. In Bulgaria, in which the banking sector assets exceed the GDP level, and the Greek banks are participating in the total banking assets with over 26%, i.e. 37% of the total GDP, situation became especially uncertain. In that country, the entire problem with withdrawal of banks was particularly stressed also because of the fact that major resources for the robust credit financing growth of the Greek bank subsidiaries, were coming from abroad (credit-deposit ratio was as high as 200%), and not from retail deposits, as was the case for instance in the Czech Republic. Therefore withdrawal of banks with Greek capital, in view of the level

rastom kamatnih stopa što bi pak dodatno privuklo strane investitore. Treća grupa zemalja su pak one koje se utrkuju kako bi privukle strane investitore nudeći im atraktivne prinose. Razlog tome nalazi se u naglom rastu globalne likvidnosti nakon brojnih paketa pomoći od strane centralnih banaka najrazvijenijih zemalja i tzv. quantitative easing mera. Zbog toga su tržišta razvijenih ekonomija u drugoj polovini 2009. bila preplavljena likvidnošću koja je krenula u potragu za visokim prinosima. Pojedine ekonomije u razvoju koje su najviše bile pogođene krizom, ali i ekonomije koje potresa fiskalna kriza, podigle su kamatne stope kako bi privukle taj kapital. Analize analitičara za ove zemlje dostupne su na Bloomberg-u, Reuters-u i drugim svetski rasprostranjenim informacionim sistemima, pružajući neophodne informacije stranim investitorima o mogućnostima i isplativosti plasmana u te zemlje. Ne retko, analitičari ih opisuju kao egzotične destinacije u smislu brze zarade, ali i velikog kreditnog rizika.

Prilikom dizajniranja mera usmerenih na kontrolu priliva stranog kapitala ne treba zaboraviti da je finansijska "kreativnost" savremenih investitora impresivna, i da vrlo često rezultira iznalaženjem načina da se uvedene mere "zaobiđu". Drugim rečima, jednom kada se otvore vrata stranom kapitalu, ukoliko on bude imao interes, on će svakako pronaći načine da i dalje ulazi na profitonosno tržište. I zaista, ukoliko se pogledaju iskustva brojnih zemalja u razvoju sa implementacijom mera usmerenih na kontrolu bankarskih tokova, jasno je da su vrlo često one bile izbegnute bankarskom verziranošću, a da su željeni efekti izostali. Umesto toga, promenjena je samo strukturu izvora kredita. Pravi primer predstavlja obavezna rezerva. Snaga njenog uticaja na kreditnu aktivnost, inflaciju i ostale makroekonomske varijable u suštini zavisi od mogućnosti njenog zaobilaženja. Ovo posebno kada je i ograničenje bankarskih kredita na snazi, kada zahtev za rastom obaveznih rezervi značajno povećava troškove bankarskog posredovanja i time indukuje rast direktnog zaduživanja preduzeća u inostranstvu (tzv. cross-border krediti). Dakle, umesto da smanji prilive, rast obavezne rezerve je samo otvorio nove, direktne kanale priliva. I ne samo to. Ovim

postupkom ne retko se otvaraju i distributivni efekti obavezne rezerve, obzirom da direktan pristup stranom kapitalu imaju samo bolje firme, dok su firme manjih kapaciteta ostale usmerene na kredite od lokalnih banaka koji su dodatno poskupeli usled nepodsticajne politike obavezne rezerve. Konačno, ne treba zaboraviti ni činjenicu da čak i kada su ove mere efikasne u smislu smanjenja obima kredita ili njihove stope rasta, one istovremeno mogu da smanje proizvodnju, potrošnju i ukupno blagostanje, kao i da imaju negativan uticaj na inflaciju i tekuća plaćanja. Zato je jako bitno da mere za ograničenje priliva stranog kapitala budu dobro odmerene, i usmerene samo ka "nepoželjnim" oblicima priliva.

Obnavljanje priliva kapitala u azijskim i latinoameričkom zemljama u razvoju

U poslednjih nekoliko dekada prilivi kapitala u zemlje u razvoju imali su karakter cikličnih priliva. Posebno intenzivni bili su prilivi tokom 90-ih koji su dostigli rekordne nivoe neposredno pre azijske krize 1997. Drugi talas priliva pokrenut je 2002. kada je kapital išao ka zemljama u razvoju sve do eskalacije svetske finansijske krize. Ipak, između ova dva perioda postojala je i bitna razlika. Prvo, u periodu nakon 2002. prilivi su mahom išli ka azijskim zemljama u razvoju koje su beležile svetske finansijske krize. Drugo, privatni kapital je preuzeo dominantnu ulogu, a najveće učešće beleži SDI. Konačno, makroekonomska situacija je u većini zemalja u razvoju ka kojima je kapital usmeren bila znatno bolja u ovom drugom periodu, režimi deviznog kursa su znatno fleksibilniji a devizne rezerve veće.

Nakon nagle kontrakcije priliva pokrenutih 2002. a posebno portfolio investicija koje su u 2008. zabeležile neto odliv iz zemalja u razvoju,

of described indicators, could endanger the fixed exchange rate of the national currency lev, causing a sudden growth of liabilities denominated in foreign currency, and setting in motion the spiral of accelerated growth of bad loans. As tensions grew, Bulgarian Central Bank adopted stricter rules regarding capital and liquidity ratios. Primarily, these were the liquidity buffer zones in case of sudden shocks, to be determined for each bank individually on the basis of the stress testing results, but also the allowed level of exposure to one client or to a group of clients. In addition, both in Bulgaria and Romania (where the banking sector assets are surpassing GDP level), the fall in profitability of the banking sector in 2009 was higher in comparison with the other European developing countries, and a question is raised not infrequently of the very survival of certain banks. The main reason for the fall in profitability indubitably lies in the growing share of bad loans which shall soon reach critical level (estimate of the IMF for Romania in 2010 is 20% of total loans, i.e. 16% of the total banking sector assets in Romania). Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that foreign banks subsidiaries are independent legal entities operating in accordance with laws of the host countries, and are subject to their strict regulations, but also to the deposits protection scheme. In this regard, banks in Serbia, regardless of their ownership structure, are highly capitalised so that the options for some unforeseen event to occur are few (capital adequacy of banks with the Greek capital is some 25%). If we are to ignore the problem of Greek banks, there are no particular reasons for some major panic when speaking of other forms of net capital inflows from Greece into other countries of Eastern Europe. Macedonia is the only country having a substantial export to Greece (over 13%), so that the fall in Greek imports from Macedonia could have a negative effect on external position of Macedonia. On the other hand, the level of FDIs coming from Greece into other Eastern European countries is not very high (Albania: 8%, Bulgaria: 7.5%, Serbia: 6%). Albania is the only country recording a substantial impact on its external position caused by the dramatic fall in remittances from Greece.

Therefore, sudden foreign capital inflow into many countries in the period before the crisis did not come free of charge. Foreign debt level of many developing countries was suddenly increased, so that the level of foreign debt (mainly of the private sector) reached as high as 104% of the GDP in Bulgaria, and 88% in Croatia. Thus, the question is rightfully raised of sustainability of such a level and structure of the debt in the medium-term perspective. These two countries have been especially impacted by substantial volatility of foreign inflows during the latest period, because of the fixed foreign exchange rate regime (currency board) in Bulgaria, and the quasi-fixed foreign exchange rate in Croatia. Credit risk substantially grew, especially in Bulgaria where it recorded extremely adverse debt maturity structure (short-term liabilities reaching almost 50% of the GDP). On the other hand, in the countries with the floating or managed floating exchange rate regime, for example Romania and Serbia, which were during the crisis facing a strong depreciation, great pressure was suffered by the bank clients having high foreign currency liabilities yet revenues in local currency. With this in mind, it is not odd to hear recommendations made by the IMF experts regarding the introduction of certain controls in the vulnerable financial markets of the developing countries.

Measures to limit foreign capital inflows: yes or no?

If we are to look a few decades back in the past, many attempts may be identified in the introduction of measures aimed at limiting foreign capital inflows. Some were successful, others only partially so, and some other ones completely failed. In other words, experiences of different countries in the implementation of capital controls vary, and were greatly dependent on the motives for their introduction, nature of measures and specific features of the country at hand (for example, administrative capacity for implementation of such measures). It is undisputable that the measures most often were being introduced in order to secure monetary control and reduce pressures on foreign exchange rate and stability

strani kapital je u drugoj polovini 2009. ponovo krenuo ka zemljama u razvoju. Glavni pokretači ovih priliva svakako su više kamatne stope u pojedinim zemljama u razvoju (npr. Brazil, Indija), privredni rast koji je veći u odnosu na razvijene zemlje, a u pojedinim slučajevima podsticajno su delovala i popravljena salda trgovinskog bilansa.

Prema projekcijama IIF neto priliv stranog kapitala u zemlje u razvoju u 2010. iznosiće preko 800 milijardi dolara (u 2009. iznosio 581 milijardi dolara). Najintenzivniji oblik priliva, prema procenama ovog Instituta, svakako su SDI i portfolio investicije, dok će prilivi u bankarski sektor biti nešto niži. Snažan rast portfolio investicija svakako je rezultat vraćanja stranih investitora koji su krajem 2008. naglo povukli plasmane zbog uzdrmanog poverenja u korporativni sektor u zemaljama u razvoju. Vraćanje upravo ovog oblika priliva može se tumačiti kao obnavljanje poverenja stranih investitora u pogledu privrednog rasta zemalja u razvoju. Destinacija ka kojoj su portfolio investicije uglavnom bile usmerene u 2010. svakako su azijske zemlje u razvoju (oko 93 milijardi dolara), a pre svega Kina (36 milijardi dolara) i Indija (30 milijardi dolara). Od azijskih zemalja u razvoju, jedina zemlja koja beleži deficit tekućeg računa je Indija. On će pak biti amortizovan sufiticom kapitalnog računa, snažnim rastom GDP-a (8% - 9% godišnje), dinamikom razvoja privatnog sektora i obnavljanjem privatizacionog programa. Vlada Indije nedavno je povećala i limite uvedene na kupovinu domaćih obveznica od strane nerezidenata (sa 5 na 10 milijardi dolara) kako bi se pružila podrška finansiranju investicija u infrastrukturne objekte, a kupovine indijskih akcija tokom septembra 2010. zabeležile su snažan rast. Sa druge strane, i rast kamatnih stopa tj. kamatnih diferencijala u odnosu na razvijene zemlje ponovo je pokrenuo i carry trade transakcije motivisane kamatno-kursnom arbitražom (pr. Indonezija).

Pored Azije, portfolio investicije su bile usmerene i ka zemljama Latinske Amerike a pre svega u Brazil (58 milijardi dolara, od kojih se 18 milijardi odnosi na kupovinu akcija naftnog giganta - Petrobras od strane nerezidenata). Jedan od glavnih razloga ovih kretanja svakako su značajne razlike između stopa rasta Brazila

i rasta razvijenih ekonomija, tako da postoji mogućnost da ovogodišnji neto prilivi stranog kapitala u Brazil prevaziđu rekordne nivoe neto priliva zabeležene 2007. Pored portfolio investicija, u zemljama Latinske Amerike beleži se i snažan rast carry trade transakcija.

Ipak, i dalje najveće po obimu svakako su SDI koje su u 2010. išle ka BRIC zemljama (Brazil, Rusija, Indija i Kina). Promenjena je samo sektorska struktura ovog oblika priliva, imajući u vidu da su u 2010. SDI najviše bile usmerene ka prerađivačkoj industriji.

Zaključci

Srpska ekonomija je mala ekonomija. Iskustvo potvrđuje da su strani investitori skloniji da u takve zemlje ulažu na kraće rokove, te da su ovi plasmani vrlo često motivisani brzim zaradama tj. profitima po osnovu kamatnih diferencijala i/ili anticipiranih promena deviznog kursa. Na prve znake nestabilnosti na domaćem finansijskom tržištu, ovaj kapital napušta zemlju. Sa druge strane, intencije monetarnih i drugih vlasti u zemljama u razvoju svakako su da strani investitori u njima vide mogućnost za dugoročnije poslovanje, jer to može rezultirati značajnim poželjnim efektima po nacionalnu ekonomiju. Ovo posebno u početnim fazama razvoja finansijskih tržišta koje karakteriše niska ili nedovoljna likvidnost, odsustvo tržišnih instrumenata, visoke kamatne stope, neadekvatna infrastruktura i visok stepen nepoverenja među tržišnim transaktorima. Značajniji priliv stranog kapitala nesumnjivo će povećati kapitalnu bazu u maloj ekonomiji, podstaći spiralu smanjenja troškova zaduživanja i pokrenuti neophodan razvoj finansijskog tržišta. Uz to, za male otvorene ekonomije, značajniji prilivi stranog kapitala svakako su i indikator poverenja stranih investitora u nacionalnu ekonomiju.

Dakle nema sumnje da strani kapital predstavlja jedan od nezaobilaznih elemenata u tranzicionom procesu u zemljama u razvoju. Ono pak što se mora imati u vidu i što ostaje kao otvorena dilema jeste stabilnost ovih izvora: prilivi po osnovu privatizacije su jednokratni, a po osnovu zaduživanja rezultat spremnosti stranih investitora. Doznake, iako relativno stabilan izvor, ne mogu u dužem

of the financial system in case of sudden drain of short-term capital.

Measures that were most frequently used for capital control, especially in the field of long-term capital inflows, were certainly the following:

- Direct tax on capital inflow;
- Differential taxes on foreign capital inflows - for purpose of stimulating long-term inflows;
- Discouraging policy of required reserves for cross-border borrowing (in terms of rate, but also absence of remuneration on funds allocated for required reserves);
- Regulatory limits on placements of foreign investors, allowing only placements in long-term securities;
- Ban on prompt withdrawal of funds, i.e. mandatory "notification" of funds withdrawal by non-residents (for example, seven days in advance);
- Strict rules for open foreign currency positions, or introduction of asymmetric open foreign currency positions;
- Measures of prudential character (adequate liquidity/capital adequacy ratio).


Measures for limiting inflows of certain types of foreign capital may not necessarily result in reducing the volume of inflows. If adequately designed, they may impact only the changes in the maturity structure of inflows, from short-term to long-term ones. They may also influence the change in the participation of certain forms of foreign capital, stimulating inflows of the more propulsive one. Good example of these positive trends is certainly Chile. After implementation of adequate control measures in Chile, there was a substantial increase in the FDIs, while the short-term placements were reduced. On the other hand, the attempts by Colombian authorities, during the latest crisis (2007 - 2008), to intensify control of foreign capital inflows were not efficient, either in stimulating propulsive inflows or in slowing down the pesos appreciation.

While one group of countries is introducing short-term capital inflow limits, another group is only studying them, yet the third group is taking measures to attract even more foreign capital. The examples of the first group countries, which are striving lately to limit

short-term inflows, are Peru and Russia. In the group of countries that are only deliberating eventual measures is certainly South Africa. In this country, a global debate was conducted recently on the relevancy of introducing tax on short-term capital, but the final stand taken is that such a measure would be appropriate for countries recording current account surplus, and this is not the case with South Africa. The view prevailed that introduction of tax would solely result in the growth of interest rates which would, in turn, additionally attract foreign investors. The third group of countries are those racing to attract foreign investors, offering them attractive returns. The rationale is to be found in the sudden growth of global liquidity after a number of assistance packages given by the central banks of the most developed countries and the so-called quantitative easing measures. This is the reason why the markets of developed economies, in the second half of 2009, when flooded with liquidity, ventured into the quest for high returns. Certain developing economies, which have been predominantly impacted by the crisis, but also the economies shaken up by fiscal crisis, raised the interest rates in order to attract this capital. Analysis of such countries, made by analysts, now are accessible on Bloomberg, Reuters and some other worldwide information systems, offering necessary information to foreign investors on the options and profitability of placements into those particular countries. Analysts are often describing them as exotic destinations in the sense of fast gains, but also as high credit risk destinations.

When designing measures aimed at foreign capital inflow control, it must be recalled that the financial "creativity" of modern investors is impressive, and often results in finding ways to "circumvent" introduced measures. In other words, once the door is open for foreign capital, if it should be well motivated, it shall certainly find ways and means to continue its venture into the profit bearing market. Indeed, if we are to look at experiences of many developing countries with the implementation of measures aimed at control of banking flows, it is clear that very often they are circumvented through banks' ingenuity, while the desired effects remain absent. In their stead, the only

Brazilija
Brasilia



Zemlje BRIK (Brazil, Rusija, Indija i Kina)

Moskva
Moscow



BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China)

Nju Delhi
New Delhi



Peking
Beijing



change made is in the structure of crediting sources. One genuine example here is the case of the required reserves. The power of their impact on credit financing activities, inflation and other macroeconomic variables essentially depends on the opportunities for their circumvention. This especially applies when the limits on banking loans are in force, and when the request for growth of required reserves significantly increases costs of banking intermediation, thus inducing growth in direct cross-border borrowing by companies (cross-border credits). Hence, instead of reducing inflows, growth of required reserves only opens some other new and direct inflow channels. And that is not all. This procedure often serves for opening up the distributive effects of required reserves, as the direct access to foreign capital is granted only to better firms, while companies with lower capacities remain focused on local bank credits that have additionally gone up in prices because of unattractive required reserves policy. Finally, we must not forget the fact that even when these measures are efficient in the sense of reduction of the crediting volume or their growth rate, they can also simultaneously reduce production, consumption and overall wellbeing, and have a negative effect on inflation and current payments. Thus it is very important for the measures limiting foreign capital inflows to be well conceived and aimed only at “unwanted” forms of inflow.

Revival of capital inflows into Asian and Latin American developing countries

During the last several decades, capital inflows in the developing countries had a character of cyclic inflows. Especially intensive inflows were recorded during the 1990s when they reached record levels immediately prior to the Asian crisis in 1997. The second wave of inflows started in 2002 when capital was flowing towards the developing countries and lasted until the escalation of the world financial crisis. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference between these two periods. Firstly, in the period after 2002, inflows were mostly streamlined towards the Asian developing countries recording current account surplus,

while in the initial period these countries were recording current account deficit. Asian crisis was the turning point in the sense of transition in those countries from the position of deficit to the position of surplus of the current account, as the crisis of 1997 had unambiguously demonstrated that a high current account deficit is not sustainable in the long-term perspective. Today, these countries are extremely high capital exporters, and are recording current account surplus. Secondly, private capital took over a dominant role and the highest capital share is recorded with the FDI. Finally, macroeconomic situation in the majority of the developing countries where the capital was streamlined, was substantially improved in this second period, exchange rate regimes became considerably more flexible, and the foreign exchange reserves higher.

After sudden contraction of inflows initiated in 2002, and especially portfolio investments that have in the year 2008 recorded net outflow from developing countries, foreign capital, in the second half of 2009, started again to flow towards the developing countries. The main triggers of these inflows were certainly high interest rates in some developing countries (for example, Brazil and India), economic growth that was higher in respect to the developed countries, and in some cases the improved trade balance acted as attractive incentive.

According to the IIF projections, net foreign capital inflow into the developing countries in 2010, will reach over 800 billion dollars (in 2009 it was 581 billion dollars). The form of inflow with the highest intensity, according to the estimates of this Institute, certainly is the FDI and portfolio investments, while inflows into the banking sector will be slightly lower. Strong growth of portfolio investments is certainly the result of the return of foreign investors who have in late 2008 suddenly withdrawn their placements due to the disturbed confidence in the corporate sector of the developing countries. The return actually of this form of inflow may be interpreted as a renewed confidence of foreign investors regarding the economic growth of the developing countries. Destination towards which portfolio investments are mainly directed, in 2010, certainly remain Asian developing countries

periodu da nadomeste reduciranje mogućnosti priliva po osnovu eksternog zaduživanja i stranih direktnih investicija. U nastojanju da se privuče strani kapital na dugoročnijoj osnovi, sa akcentom na onaj propulzivni, zemlja u razvoju mora „zaslužiti“ poverenje stranog kapitala. Ovo iz razloga što obim priliva stranog kapitala i njegova ročna i rizična struktura u mnogome zavise od uspešnosti u implementiranju reformi, uspostavljanju tržišne privrede, restrukturiranju i privatizaciji preduzeća, uspostavljanju makroekonomske stabilnosti i zadovoljavajućih stopa privrednog rasta.

Pored ročne i rizične strukture priliva stranog kapitala, jako je bitno pratiti i njihove efekte. Značajniji priliv stranog kapitala uglavnom je praćen aprecijacijom domaće valute i akumulacijom rezervi. To pak, sa druge strane, podrazumeva neophodno prilagođavanje fiskalne i monetarne politike i jačanje regulatornog, a pre svega prudencijalnog okvira. Kako bi se pomirili domaći i interesi stranog kapitala, neophodno je da se stvori povoljan poslovni i regulatorni ambijent. Drugim rečima, uspostavljanje čvrstog pravnog sistema koji će garantovati vlasnička prava kako domaćih tako i stranih investitora i kreditora nameće se kao neminovnost. Paralelno sa tim, ako ne i pre toga, mora se povećati i ponuda instrumenata duga, a pre svih državnih hartija koje su uvek atraktivne kako za domaće, tako i za inostrane kupce. U nekoj od narednih faza razvoja neophodno je podstaći i podržati razvoj tržišta derivatnih instrumenata, kako bi učesnici na finansijskom tržištu mogli efikasno da hedžuju svoju poziciju štiteći time i sebe i ukupan finansijski sistem od deviznog rizika. Za sve navedeno, neophodno je da postoji aktivna saradnja centralne banke i drugih učesnika na finansijskom tržištu. Neophodno je da postoji volja da se finansijsko tržište razvije, i da postoji razumevanje da to neće i ne može biti brz proces.

Konkretni efekti i mere prilagođavanja na priliv stranog kapitala nisu isti za zemlje sa različitim makroekonomskim karakteristikama. Što je dobro za jednu, ne mora nužno biti dobro i za drugu zemlju. U tom smislu zemlje kojima je strani kapital potreban za postizanje tranzicione konvergencije preduzeće neophodne mere za privlačenje stranog kapitala, dok će one kojima

ti prilivi narušavaju eksternu poziciju i dovode u pitanje održivost spoljnog duga, preduzeti mere u cilju njegovog ograničenja. Sam izbor i kombinacija mera koje će centralna banka koristiti kako bi smanjila negativne i potpuno iskoristila pozitivne efekte značajnijih priliva stranog kapitala svakako će zavisi i od režima monetarne politike. U tom smislu, značajni prilivi stranog kapitala mogu predstavljati veliki problem u uslovima režima fiksnog deviznog kursa. Praksa je potvrdila da će konkretne mere i reakcije zavisi i od oblika priliva (zvanični vs privatni, strane direktne vs portfolio investicije, obveznice vs akcije), njihove očekivane ročnosti (kratkoročne vs dugoročne) i njihovog uticaja na bilanse tržišnih učesnika (da li povećavaju valutnu neusklađenost bilansa).

Determinante značajnih priliva (capital flow bonanza) u zemlje u razvoju svakako su: a) znatno više kamatne stope u odnosu na razvijene zemlje; b) više stope privrednog rasta; c) ubrzani rast cena aktive i domaćih proizvoda. Problem za zemlju u razvoju nastaje kada rast zasnovan na tražnji uzrokuje pregrevanje nacionalne ekonomije, a strani kapital prestane da dolazi ili pak krene nazad. Periodi naglog odliva kapitala beleženi su ciklično, ali je i obnavljanje priliva takođe išlo ciklično. Tako je nakon nagle kontrakcije priliva pokrenutih 2002. a posebno portfolio investicija koje su u 2008. zabeležile neto odliv iz zemalja u razvoju, strani kapital u drugoj polovini 2009. ponovo krenuo ka zemljama u razvoju. Glavni pokretači ovih priliva svakako su više kamatne stope u pojedinim zemljama u razvoju (npr. Brazil, Indija), privredni rast koji je veći u odnosu na razvijene zemlje, a u pojedinim slučajevima podsticajno su delovala i popravljena salda trgovinskog bilansa. I dok je veliki broj zemalja u razvoju na putu obnavljanja kreditnih aktivnosti i ekonomskog oporavka, pojedine zemlje u razvoju, čije su ekonomije bile pogođene tokom finansijske krize, sada se suočavaju sa drastičnim makroekonomskim prilagođavanjem ali i sa nesigurnostima u pogledu restrukturiranja spoljnog duga.

Za Srbiju, strani kapital je bio okosnica modela rasta i srpskoj privredi je pomogao da, u odsustvu domaće štednje, ostvari svoj potencijal za tranzicionu konvergenciju. Pre izbivanja krize, najveći deo naših investicija finansiran

(some 93 billion dollars), first of all China (36 billion dollars), and India (30 billion dollars). Among the Asian developing countries, the only country recording current account deficit is India. However, it will be depreciated by the capital account surplus, robust GDP growth (8% - 9% annually), development dynamics of the private sector, and revival of privatisation programme. Government of India has recently increased the limits introduced on purchase of domestic bonds by non-residents (from 5 to 10 billion dollars) in order to offer support to financing investments into infrastructure facilities, while purchase of Indian equity shares in September 2010 recorded a strong growth. On the other hand, interest rate growth, i.e. growth of interest differentials in respect to the developed countries has again set in motion the carry trade transactions motivated by interest-exchange arbitration (for example, Indonesia).

In addition to Asia, portfolio investments were also directed towards Latin American countries, primarily towards Brazil (58 billion dollars, from this amount 18 billion for purchase of equity shares of the gas giant - Petrobras by non-residents). One of the main reasons for such trends were certainly the significant differences between growth rate of Brazil and the growth rates of developed economies, and there are prospect for this-year's net foreign capital inflows into Brazil to exceed record levels of net inflows recorded in 2007. In addition to portfolio investments, in the Latin American countries also a robust growth is recorded in the carry trade transactions.

Nevertheless, the largest in volume still remain the FDIs which were, in 2010, directed towards the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The only change that was made was in the sector structure for this form of inflow, bearing in mind that in 2010 FDIs were mainly directed towards the processing industries.

Conclusions

Serbian economy is a small-scale one. Experience has confirmed that foreign investors are rather more inclined to short-term investments in such countries, with the placements very often motivated by fast gains, i.e. profits from interest differentials and/or

anticipated exchange rate changes. At the first signs of instability on the domestic financial market, this capital leaves the country. On the other hand, intentions of monetary and other authorities in the developing countries certainly are to make foreign investors perceive in them the opportunities for long-term operations, as this can result in substantial encouraging effects for the national economy. This especially applies to the initial development phases of financial markets, characteristic for low or insufficient liquidity, absence of market instruments, high interest rates, inadequate infrastructure and high degree of mistrust amongst the market makers. Substantial foreign capital inflow is undoubtedly increasing the capital base in a small economy, setting in motion the spiral of borrowing costs reduction and instigating necessary development of financial market. In addition, for the small-scale open economies important foreign capital inflows are reliable indicators of the confidence that foreign investors have in the national economy.

There is no doubt that the foreign capital is one of the essential elements in the transition process of the developing countries. Nevertheless, what we must bear in mind, and what remains an open dilemma is the stability of these sources: inflows from privatisation are one-off flows; inflows from borrowing are the result of readiness of foreign investors to oblige. Remittances, although a relatively stable source, can not over a longer period replace reduced options of cross-border borrowing and foreign direct investments. In the attempts to attract foreign capital on longer-term basis, with the focus on the propulsive inflow, developing countries must "deserve" foreign capital's confidence. The reason here is that the foreign capital inflow volume and its maturity and risk structure greatly depend on successful implementation of reforms, establishment of market economy, restructuring and privatisation of companies, setting up macroeconomic stability and satisfactory economic growth rates.

In addition to maturity and risk structure of foreign capital inflows, it is very important to monitor their effects. Substantial inflow of foreign capital is mostly accompanied by appreciation of domestic currency and

je iz inostranih izvora, tj. iz kapitalnog priliva (udeo investicija u BDP-u iznosio je 28%, a domaće štednje svega oko 8%). Tokovi kapitala doprineli su i unapređenju infrastrukture finansijskog sektora i time povećali otpornost finansijskog sistema na šokove, obezbeđujući istovremeno efikasniju alokaciju resursa kojima smo raspolagali. Međutim, priliv stranog kapitala omogućio je našim domaćinstvima i državi da znatno podignu potrošnju. Pre izbivanja krize, praktično čitav dohodak Srbije je odlazio u potrošnju. Takav model rasta je bio socijalno privlačan, ali ekonomski neodrživ. Iako je udeo investicija u BDP-u naizgled bio visok, on nije bio dovoljan, posebno ako se ima

u vidu da struktura investicija nije podržavala jači rast konkurentnosti. S makroekonomskog stanovišta, oslanjanje na inostrane izvore sredstava, posebno kada su usmereni u potrošnju, dovelo je do velikog deficita tekućeg bilansa. U periodu pre krize deficit je dostigao čak 18% BDP-a, zbog čega je njegova dugoročna održivost s pravom dovedena u pitanje. Zbog svega navedenog može se reći da je priliv kapitala u Srbiji bio i jeste poželjan, ali treba da se okrenemo novom modelu rasta baziranom na investicijama umesto na potrošnji, i tada ćemo moći da očekujemo nove, propulzivnije prilive stranog kapitala.

accumulation of reserves. On the other hand, this implies necessary adjustments of the fiscal and monetary policies and strengthening of the regulatory, primarily, prudential framework. In order to reconcile domestic and foreign capital interests, it is necessary to create favourable business and regulatory environment. In other words, it is necessary, but also a must, to establish a robust legal system which shall guarantee proprietary rights both of local and foreign investors and creditors. Concurrently, what needs to be done promptly is to increase an offer in debt instruments, mainly of all the government securities which are always equally attractive for domestic and for the foreign buyers. In some of the forthcoming development phases, it is necessary to boost and support development of the markets trading in derivative instruments, so that the actors on the financial market could efficiently hedge their position, thus protecting both themselves but also the entire financial system from the exchange rate risk exposure. Mindful of the above stated, it is necessary to achieve an active cooperation between the central bank and the other financial market players. It is necessary to have a strong wish for the financial markets to develop, but also to understand that this shall neither be nor can be a fast process.

Concrete effects and measures of adjustment to the foreign capital inflow are not the same for countries with different macroeconomic characteristics. What is good for one country does not necessarily have to be good for some other one. In this sense, countries which are in need of foreign capital for reaching transitional convergence shall undertake necessary measures to attract foreign capital, while those who are having their external position damaged by such inflows, and their foreign debt sustainability brought into question, shall undertake measures for their limitation. The choice itself and combination of measures that the central bank will deploy in order to reduce negative and fully benefit from positive effects of substantial foreign capital inflows shall certainly depend on the monetary policy regime. In this sense, important foreign capital inflows may become a great problem if the regime of the fixed exchange rate is in force. Practice has shown that concrete measures

and reaction shall depend also on the form of inflow (official vs. private, foreign direct vs. portfolio investments, banks vs. shares), their anticipated maturity (short-term vs. long-term) and their impact on the balance sheets of market participants (are they increasing balance sheet currency mismatching).

Determinants of the capital flow bonanza in the developing countries are the following: a) substantially higher interest rate in comparison with the developed countries; b) higher economic growth rates; c) accelerated growth of assets and domestic products prices. Problem for the developing country arises when the growth, based on demand, causes overheating of the national economy, and foreign capital stops flowing in or starts flowing out. Periods of sudden capital outflow were recorded cyclically, but the renewal of inflows was cyclical as well. Hence, after a sudden contraction of inflows, set in motion in 2002, and especially the portfolio investments that have recorded net outflow from the developing countries in 2008, foreign capital in the second half of 2009 started again towards developing countries. The main triggers for these inflows were certainly higher interest rates in some developing countries (for example, Brazil, India), economic growth that was higher than in developed countries, and in some cases, improved balance of trade acted also as an incentive. Although a large number of developing countries is venturing along the path of revival of crediting activities and economic recovery, some of the developing countries with the economies impacted during the financial crisis, now are facing drastic macroeconomic adjustments, but also uncertainties regarding foreign debt restructuring.

For Serbia, foreign capital served as the backbone of its growth model and helped Serbian economy, in the absence of domestic savings, to achieve its potential for transitional conversion. Before the crisis erupted, major part of our investments was financed from foreign sources, i.e. from the capital inflows (share of investments in the GDP reached 28%, while domestic savings amounted to only some 8%). Capital flows also supported promotion of infrastructure of the financial sector thus building up the resilience of the financial system to shocks, simultaneously providing

Literatura / References

1. Ostry D. Jonathan, Ghosh R. Atish, Habermeier Karl, Chamon Marcos, Qureshi S. Mahvash, Reinhardt B. S. Dennis, "Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls", IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/10/04, February 19, 2010.
2. Hoggarth Glenn, Sterne Gabriel, "Capital flows: Causes, Consequences and policy responses", Handbooks in Central banking No. 14, Bank of England, Decembar 1997.
3. Ghosh Atish, Goretti Manuela, Joshi Bikas, Ramakrishnan Uma, Thomas Alun, Zalduendo Juan, "Capital Inflows and Balance of Payments Pressures - Tailoring Policy Responses in EMEs" IMF Policy Discussion Paper, PDP/08/2, Jun 2008.
4. Tong Hui, Wei Shang-Jin, "The composition Matters: Capital Inflows and Liquidity Crunch During a Global Economic Crisis", IMF Working Paper, WP/09/164, Avgust 2009.
5. "Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies", Institute of International Finance, Research Note, Oktobar 2010.
6. Reinhart M. Carmen, Reinhart Vincent, "Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of the Past and Present", Center for Economic Policy Research, DP6996, Oktobar 2008.
7. Calvo A. Guillermo, "Capital flows and capital-market crises: The simple Economics of Sudden Stops", Journal of Applied Economics, Vol I, No. 1, November 1998.
8. Chari V. V, Kehoe J. Patrick, "Hot Money" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department, Staff Report 228, March 2003.
9. Choi G. Woon, Cook David, "Fire Sales and the Financial Accelerator", IMF Working Paper, WP/10/141, Jun 2010.
10. Niedermayer Luděk, Bárta Vít. "The Czech experience with capital flows: challenges for monetary policy", BIS Papers No 44, December 2008.
11. José De Gregorio, "Tackling the capital inflow challenge", BIS Review 72/2010, May 2010.
12. Marković Bojan, "Poželjan priliv stranog kapitala", Govor viceguvernera Bojana Markovića na konferenciji Bloombergu u Hajatu, April 2010.

more efficient allocation of our available resources. Foreign capital inflow, however, allowed our households and the government substantial growth of consumption. Prior to the eruption of crisis, practically the entire income of Serbia was spent on consumption. Such a growth model was socially attractive, but economically unsustainable. Although the share of investments in the GDP appeared to be high, it was not sufficient, especially in view of the fact that the structure of investments did not enhance strong growth of competitive advantage. From the macroeconomic aspect,

reliance on foreign sources of funding, especially when they were channelled into consumption, caused high current account deficit. In the period prior to the crisis, deficit reached as high as 18% of the GDP, so its long-term sustainability was rightfully questioned. Mindful of the above stated, it may be argued that the capital inflow in Serbia was and remains sought after, but that we should turn towards a new growth model based on investments instead of consumption, and it is only then that we can expect the arrival of new, more propulsive foreign capital inflows.